



In 1931, at the very dawn of First Amendment jurisprudence, Chief Justice
Hughes presciently observed that "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people" was "a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."'
Since that time, the First Amendment has been interpreted by courts primarily
as a guarantor of the ongoing legitimacy of democratic self-governance in the
United States. As Justice Cardozo remarked in 1937, freedom of expression is
"the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
freedom."2
To view the First Amendment "as the guardian of our democracy,"'
however, is to adopt a particular image of the American polity. It is to imagine
that democratic legitimacy flows from the accountability of the state to the
public opinion of its population. From its inception, therefore, First
Amendment doctrine has primarily sought to protect from government
regulation an independent realm of speech within which public opinion is
understood to be forged.
The consequence of this orientation is that traditional First Amendment
doctrine has had rather little to say about the speech of the government itself.'
In this Essay, I shall explore the corner of this perplexing territory in which
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are located the difficult constitutional questions raised by government subsidies
for speech. Subsidized speech challenges two fundamental assumptions of
ordinary First Amendment doctrine. It renders uncertain the status of speakers,
forcing us to determine whether speakers should be characterized as
independent participants in the formation of public opinion or instead as
instrumentalities of the government. And it renders uncertain the status of
government action, forcing us to determine whether subsidies should be
characterized as government regulations imposed on persons or instead as a
form of government participation in the marketplace of ideas.
These two questions of social characterization underlie all constitutional
cases of subsidized speech. Like many First Amendment issues, they demand
complex and contextual normative judgments about the boundaries of distinct
constitutional domains in social space.6 Yet they have never been explicitly
addressed by the Court, which has instead chosen to address cases of
subsidized speech primarily by relying upon two doctrines, which respectively
prohibit unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint discrimination.
Both of these doctrines ignore the questions of social characterization that
actually impel First Amendment analysis, and as a consequence, each doctrine
has grown increasingly detached from the real sources of constitutional
decisionmaking. The doctrines have become formalistic labels for conclusions,
rather than useful tools for understanding. It is no wonder that the haphazard
inconsistency of the Court's decisions dealing with subsidized speech has long
been notorious; the precedents have rightly been deemed "confused" and
"incoherent, a medley of misplaced epigrams."
7
My thesis in this Essay is that cases of subsidized speech can be usefully
analyzed only if we fashion a doctrine that explicitly addresses relevant
processes of social characterization. I hope to establish this thesis by
demonstrating its value in the comprehension of particular cases. In Part I of
this Essay, therefore, I examine FCC v. League of Women Voters' to explore
the consequences of characterizing government action as a regulation of speech
5. I do not, of course, mean to imply that these two questions of social characterization exhaust the
constitutional issues that can be posed by cases of subsidized speech. I mean only to claim that such cases
will, at a minimum, require a response to these two questions.
6. For a general discussion, see Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249 (1995).
7. William T. Mayton, "Buying-Up Speech": Active Government and the Terms of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 373, 376 (1994); see David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675, 682 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Evpression,
80 MINN. L. RE'. 543, 544-45 (1995); Michael J. Elston, Note, Artists and Unconstitutional Conditions:
The Big Bad Wolf Won't Subsidize Little Red Riding Hood's Indecent Art, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS.,
Summer 1993, at 327, 333, 341-42, 358; Gary Feinerman, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: The
Crossroads of Substantive Rights and Equal Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1378 (1991); Michael
Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV.
185, 196 (1992). See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 183 (1992).
8. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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located in the democratic social domain called "public discourse."9 In Part II
of this Essay I scrutinize the cases of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia' and Rust v. Sullivan" to probe the implications of
characterizing government action as a regulation of speech located in a
different kind of social formation, which may be termed the "managerial
domain."' 2 In Part II of this Essay I discuss the recent controversy over
funding restrictions imposed by statute upon the National Endowment for the
Arts to assess the implications of characterizing government action as a
regulation of public discourse or instead as a form of state participation in the
marketplace of ideas.
I. SUBSIDIZED SPEECH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
A democratic government derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is
considered responsive to its citizens. This form of legitimacy presupposes that
citizens are, in the relevant sense, independent of their government. We would
rightly regard a government that treated its citizens as mere instrumentalities
of the state-"closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to
communicate," 3-as totalitarian rather than democratic. One important
function of the public/private distinction within American constitutional law
is to mark this normative distinction between the independent citizen, who is
deemed "private," and the state functionary, who is deemed "public."'"
What it means in constitutional thought for a democratic government to be
"responsive" to its citizens is a complex subject. To summarize arguments I
have made elsewhere, 5 First Amendment doctrine envisions a distinct realm
of citizen speech, called "public discourse,"' 6 in which occurs a perpetual and
unruly process of reconciling the demands of individual and collective
autonomy. First Amendment jurisprudence conceptualizes public discourse as
a site for the forging of an independent public opinion to which democratic
legitimacy demands that the state remain perennially responsive. That is why
the First Amendment jealously safeguards public discourse from state
censorship.
Because First Amendment restraints on government regulation of public
discourse are meant to embody the value of democratic self-governance, they
9. See ROBERT C. POST, CONsTrrTrnONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY. CO M.MIU.TY. MANAGEME- T 6-10
(1995).
10. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
11. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
12. See POST, supra note 9, at 4-6.
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.. 393 U.S 503. 511 (1969)
14. For a full discussion, see POST. supra note 9, at 188-89. 280-81, The public/pnvaic distinction.
of course, bears many different kinds of meanings. only one of %hich I am explonng here
15. See Robert Post, Between Democracy and Commnuntti The Legal Constitunon of Social Form. 35
NOMOS 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds.. 1993).
16. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. 485 U.S 46. 55 (1988)
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contain within them many powerful and controversial presuppositions. They
assume, for example, the existence of a domain of democratic self-
determination, in which persons are independent and autonomous." Within
the democratic domain of public discourse, persons must be given the freedom
to determine their own collective identity and ends.'8 Outside of public
discourse, however, where the value of democratic self-governance is not
preeminent, First Amendment doctrine will reflect other constitutional values,
and it will presuppose a quite different notion of the legal subject.' 9 The
nature of First Amendment analysis, therefore, will depend on whether or not
speech is conceptualized as within the democratic domain of public
discourse.20
This is of particular importance in cases of subsidized speech. When the
state supports speech, it establishes a relationship between itself and private
speakers that can sometimes compromise the independence of the latter.
Subsidization may thus transport speech from public discourse into other
constitutional domains. But because there are many examples of subsidized
speech that are unproblematically characterized as within public discourse, the
mere fact of subsidization is not sufficient to remove speech from public
discourse. Subsidization is only one factor that must be considered when
making judgments about the characterization of speech.2' In this Part of the
Essay I explore the nature of these judgments, examining the process and
consequences of classifying subsidized speech as within or outside of public
discourse.
A. Unconstitutional Conditions, Subsidized Speech, and Public Discourse
That subsidization simpliciter is not determinative of the classification of
speech, and that such classification has fundamental and far-reaching
consequences for First Amendment analysis, was recently recognized by the
Court in its opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,22 which struck down a state university's policy of excluding
religious expression from its subsidies of student speech. The Court observed:
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.
When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
17. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse.
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1128-33 (1993).
18. See id. at 1116-19.
19. See Post, supra note 6, at 1277.
20. On the boundaries of public discourse, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv.
L. ReV. 601, 667-84 (1990).
21. On the highly contextualized nature of such judgments, see id.
22. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message .... [W]hen the government appropriates public funds
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes. When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee.
It does not follow, however .... that viewpoint-based restrictions
are proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A holding that
the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private
persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's
own speech, which is controlled by different principles .... The
distinction between the University's own favored message and the
private speech of students is evident in the case before us.2'
The Court's point is that when the state itself speaks, it may adopt a
determinate content and viewpoint, even "when it enlists private entities to
convey its own message. '24 But when the state attempts to restrict the
independent contributions of citizens to public discourse, even if those
contributions are subsidized, First Amendment rules prohibiting content and
viewpoint discrimination will apply. The reasoning of Rosenberger thus rests
on two premises. First, speech may be subsidized and yet remain within public
discourse; the mere fact of subsidization is not sufficient to justify classifying
speech as within or outside public discourse. Second, substantive First
Amendment analysis will depend on whether the citizen who speaks is
characterized as a public functionary or as an independent participant in public
discourse.
This second premise may seem obvious, but it has important implications
for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. That doctrine, as characterized
by one eminent commentator, "holds that government may not grant a benefit
on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether."25 Thus in Perry v.
Sindermann26 the Court held that a state college system could not fire a
teacher due to his public criticisms of the system, because "even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
23. Id. at 2518-19 (citations omitted).
24. Ild. at 2518; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUtIONAL LAW § 12-4. at 807-08 (2d
ed. 1988); Cole, supra note 7, at 702-04 (enumerating justifications for govcrnment-supponed speech). But
cf. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TiE
RELIGION CLAUSES 106-07 (1995). 1 defer to Part III the question of whether the First Amendment places
any constraints on government expression of such viewpoints.
25. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions. 102 HARV. L REV 1413. 1415 (1989).
26. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons .... [i]t
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. 27
Of course this formulation is essentially circular, because it does not
specify the nature of the First Amendment rights to be protected, and in
particular, it fails to specify whether the parameters of those rights are
contingent upon the granting of the benefit.2" The most common way of
interpreting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, therefore, is to hold that
it prohibits the government from doing "indirectly what it may not do
directly,"29 so that First Amendment rights are defined independently of the
provision of the benefit.
In cases of subsidized speech, however, the provision of a benefit can
sometimes convert a citizen into a public functionary and thereby alter the
nature of the relevant First Amendment rights and analysis. The abstract
principles underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine simply do not
address this possibility. Sophisticated efforts to repair the doctrine by
incorporating pertinent but generic criteria like "baselines''"" or "systemic
effects"3t also fail to account for the fact that the categorization of the status
of a speaker will ordinarily be a very specific, context-bound judgment,
informed by the particular First Amendment considerations relevant to
determining the boundaries of public discourse.
With regard to questions of subsidized speech, therefore, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, as Cass Sunstein has noted, is "too crude and too
general to provide help in dealing with contested cases. 32 The doctrine serves
primarily to remind us that First Amendment analysis does not end merely
because the government has chosen to act through the provision of a subsidy.
The doctrine recalls the truth of the first premise that we observed in the
passage from Rosenberger: Speech may be subsidized and yet nevertheless
remain within public discourse, so that even though the state may retain the
"greater" power to terminate the subsidy (and perhaps also the speech), it does
not follow that it also retains the "lesser" power to control the speech in ways
27. Id. at 597.
28. See Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability
Approach, 43 UCLA L. REv. 371, 388-93 (1995).
29. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1415; see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911, 1921 (1995) (discussing indirect limitations of state powers under Tenth
Amendment).
30. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1359-74 (1984); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1489.
31. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1490.
32. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 620 (1990); see also
William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the




that are otherwise inconsistent with First Amendment restraints on government
regulations of public discourse.
The public forum cases provide the most obvious illustration of how
persons can receive government benefits and nevertheless remain within public
discourse. These cases hold that speech occurring on certain kinds of
government property, like streets and parks, will be "subject to the highest
scrutiny. ' 33 Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that "this Court has
recognized that the existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in the form of
Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas
that have 'been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity,' or have
been 'expressly dedicated to speech activity."'"" Publications that receive the
"subsidy" extended by the United States to second-class mail provide another
example of subsidized speech that receives significant First Amendment
protection.35 Receipt of the subsidy does not remove such publications from
the safeguards otherwise accorded public discourse.3
6
These examples demonstrate that the presence or absence of a subsidy is
not determinative of whether speech will be classified as within or outside the
domain of public discourse. Subsidized speech that is classified as public
discourse will receive similar kinds of First Amendment protections as are
extended to public discourse generally. It follows from this that (then) Justice
Rehnquist could not have been correct when he observed in Regan v. Taration
with Representation that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise
of a fundamental right does not infringe the right. '37 Rehnquist's observation
rests on the fallacy that subsidization is always sufficient to determine the
status of speech, whereas there are circumstances in which subsidized speech
will be classified as within public discourse and in which the selective
withdrawal of subsidies will be deemed an improper regulation of that
discourse. Consider, for example, the fatal constitutional difficulties that would
arise if a state were to exclude speech about nuclear power or abortion from
33. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. 505 U S 672. 678 (1992)
34. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991) (citations omitted)
35. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146. 151 (1946); see also Buckley % Valwo. 424 U S I.
93 n.127 (1976) (finding public campaign financing permissible subsidy); MARK G YLDOF. WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLMCS. LAW. AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 234-35 ( 1983) (listing
examples of government speech subsidies).
36. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513. 518 (1958) (holding First Amendment limits Congress's
power to regulate mail); see also United States v. Van L4eeuwen. 397 U.S 249. 251-52 (1970). Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963); Hannegan v. Esquire. Inc.. 327 U.S 146. 155-56 (1946). Tolleit
v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1973): O'Bnen v. Leidinger. 452 F Supp 720. 725 (ED
Va. 1978); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421. 425-26 (E.D. Cal, 1970)
37. 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). Justice Rehnquist did observe that '*Itlhe case s ould be dtfferent if
Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ""ailml at the suppression
of dangerous ideas."' Id. at 548 (citations omitted). Howeer. as the examples offered in the follong
paragraph in the text indicate, constitutional restraints on governmental use of subsidies to regulate speech
in public discourse would apply to discrimination that is content-based as %ell as viewA-point-based
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a public forum, or if Congress were to withhold second-class mailing subsidies
from magazines that discuss these issues.3"
If subsidized speech can sometimes be classified as public discourse, it can
also, as Rosenberger recognizes, be deemed equivalent to the speech of the
state itself. Such speech will not be conceptualized as requiring protection from
the government, but will instead be regarded as state action, and hence subject
to the same array of constitutional restraints and prerogatives that we accord
to the government. 39 Some have claimed that the mere fact of a state subsidy
is sufficient to justify classifying speech as state action. For example, a
government official recently testified that "when the government funds a
certain view, the government itself is speaking. It therefore may
constitutionally determine what is to be said."40 We know from the public
forum and U.S. mail cases, however, that this assertion is false. Government
funding is not by itself sufficient to establish state action in other contexts,4
and there is no reason why we should reach a different conclusion within the
context of subsidized speech.
B. FCC v. League of Women Voters: Subsidized Speech and the
Constitutional Characterization of Speakers
One of the striking peculiarities of First Amendment jurisprudence is that
speakers can be assigned intermediate positions between private participants
in public discourse and state actors. The clearest and most illuminating
example of the Court's creation of such an intermediate status may be found
in the context of the broadcast media. In 1969, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,42 the Court upheld FCC regulations that would have been plainly
unconstitutional if applied to participants in public discourse.43 At issue in
38. Cf Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating state
prohibition of policy-oriented speech on monthly bills of public utilities).
39. For a good discussion of government participation in the system of freedom of expression, see
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM oF ExPREssION 697-716 (1970). On the extreme difficulty of these questions, see Shiffrin,
supra note 4, at 572-605; Yudof, supra note 4, at 871-72. The obvious differences between the speech of
private persons and the speech of the state have recently featured prominently with respect to the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has tended to stress, as Justice O'Connor has put it, the "crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995) (applying Mergens distinction).
40. First Amendment Implications of the Rust v. Sullivan Decision: Hearing on First Amendment
Implications of the Rust v. Sullivan Decision Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 11 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Leslie H. Southwick, Deputy
Ass't Att'y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
41. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding acts of privately operated school
whose income is derived primarily from public sources are not state action); Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defender's actions do not constitute state action).
42. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
43. See FCC v. National Citizens' Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 (1978).
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Red Lion was the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters to give
adequate coverage to opposing views of public issues, as well as subsidiary
FCC rules requiring that those personally attacked be given a right to reply.
The Court began its reasoning with the premise that broadcast frequencies
were scarce: "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of
every individual to speak, write, or publish." The Court thereupon
characterized broadcast licenses as conferring a "temporary privilege' ' 5 to use
designated frequencies on the condition that a licensee "conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity,
be barred from the airwaves."'
Red Lion thus conceptualized broadcasters as public trustees, "7 rather than
as independent and private participants in public discourse. As a consequence,
the Court interpreted the First Amendment as protecting not the broadcasters'
independent contributions to public discourse, but instead the speech facilitated
by broadcasters. The Court carefully refrained from attributing First
Amendment rights to broadcasters: -[T]he people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
is the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount."'
Four years later, however, members of the Court began to have second
thoughts. Four Justices in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee49
held, in a complex and fractured decision, that although broadcasters were
"public trustees," their speech was not that of the government itself, and hence
that the behavior of broadcasters did not constitute state action for purposes of
triggering constitutional requirements. 50 These Justices were concerned to
craft an intermediate position for broadcasters, one that envisioned an
44. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
45. Id. at 394.
46. Id. at 389.
47. See id. at 389-90.
48. Id. at 390.
49. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
50. Such an outcome, Chief Justice Burger noted, would subordinate "j]ournalistc discretion" to -the
rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on Government." Id. at 121. Other Justices noted that
it would convert broadcasters into "common carriers" and "thus produce a result wholly inimical to the
broadcasters' own First Amendment rights." Id. at 140 (Stewart. J.. concumng); see also id. at 149-65
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justices White, Powell, and Blackmun did not reach the question of state action.
See id. at 146-48. Justices Brennan and Marshall would have found that
the public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally created preferred status of broadcast
licensees, the pervasive federal regulation of broadcast programming, and the Commission's
specific approval of the challenged broadcaster policy combine in this case to bnng the
promulgation and enforcement of that policy within the orbit of constitutional imperatives.
Ld. at 173 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"essentially private broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to
public interest standards."5'
This compromise was ratified by the full Court in 1981, when it declared
that "the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to
exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public
[duties].' ' 52 In stark contrast to Red Lion, the Court went out of its way to
refer to the need to "properly balance[] the First Amendment rights of ... the
public ... and broadcasters. 53 It thus signified that while broadcasters would
be seen in some respects as public fiduciaries, without independent First
Amendment rights, they would be regarded in other respects as participants in
public discourse, with attendant constitutional protections. This resolution
seems plainly necessary to explain why the Court has persistently attributed the
full spectrum of First Amendment rights and protections to broadcast
journalists when they are sued for defamation and invasion of privacy. 4
I mention this compromise because it provides the necessary background
for grasping an extraordinarily complex and fascinating case involving
subsidized speech, FCC v. League of Women Voters.5 The case involved the
constitutionality of section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act, which
prohibited "editorializing" by any "noncommercial educational broadcasting
station" receiving grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),
"a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial
television and radio stations. 56 Section 399 was justified on the ground that
public deliberation could be distorted by potential government pressure on the
editorial policies of government-supported broadcast stations.
Because this justification turned on an empirically based theory of
potential danger to the structure of public deliberation, one might have
expected the Court, as Justice Stevens urged in dissent, to "respect" the
"judgment" of Congress. 7 But Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
introduced a new variable into the equation:
[W]e have ... made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a vital and
independent form of communicative activity. As a result, the First
Amendment must inform and give shape to the manner in which
Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area. Unlike common
51. Id. at 120.
52. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 110 (1973)); see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986).
53. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981); see also id. at 396.
54. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); cf Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979) (analyzing proposed privilege under substantive First Amendment doctrine).
55. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
56. Id. at 366.




carriers, broadcasters are "entitled under the First Amendment to
exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public
[duties]."" 8
By specifically invoking the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, Brennan
signalled that broadcasters could be conceptualized as independent contributors
to public discourse and accordingly could be protected by independent judicial
review.
If broadcasters were to be regarded as public trustees without independent
First Amendment rights in some circumstances, and as constitutionally
protected private participants in public discourse in other circumstances, how
ought they be classified with respect to a prohibition on their ability to
editorialize? Brennan's response was clear and unequivocal: *'IThe special
place of the editorial in our First Amendment jurisprudence simply reflects the
fact that the press, of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part,
carries out a historic, dual responsibility in our society of reporting information
and of bringing critical judgment to bear on public affairs." 9
Broadcast editorials, like those of the press generally, were thus
categorized constitutionally as "part and parcel of 'a profound national
commitment ... that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." '6° Broadcasters, when disseminating editorials, were to be
classified as independent contributors to public discourse; like the press
generally, they were to be regarded as possessing the self-determining agency
of private citizens.
Noncommercial educational stations, however, are not equivalent to private
broadcasters; they are supported in part by federal financial assistance
channelled through CPB. It was therefore possible to argue that noncommercial
educational stations were public functionaries, even if broadcasters generally
could not be so characterized. Indeed, in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, nearly a decade before, Justice Douglas had made exactly this
point.6' He contrasted the independent status of commercial broadcasters to
CPB's noncommercial grantees, whom he regarded as owned and managed by
a federal agency and hence as instrumentalities of the state constrained by the
First Amendment to act as common carriers.62
Justice Brennan rejected this characterization of noncommercial stations.
He pointed to "the elaborate structure established by the Public Broadcasting
Act ' 63 that was specifically designed to "protect the stations from
58. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378 (citations omitted) Brennan's position rcprc-,ents an
implicit reversal of his earlier opinion in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm .412 U S 94. 110 (19
7 3)
59. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 382 (citation omitted)
60. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U S 254. 270 (1964))
61. See 412 U.S. at 149-50 (Douglas. J., concurrng).
62. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
63. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 388-89.
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governmental coercion and interference." 64 Brennan concluded that the
structure of the Act "ensured ... that these stations would be as insulated from
federal interference as the wholly private stations.,' 65 The status of the
noncommercial stations would thus be classified as equivalent to that of
broadcasters generally.
Notice, then, that before the opinion in League of Women Voters can even
begin to engage in what would ordinarily be regarded as First Amendment
analysis, it must accomplish at least three predicate acts of characterization:
with regard to broadcasters; with regard to broadcasters' editorials; and with
regard to noncommercial broadcasters' editorials. Each time, the opinion opts
for characterizing section 399 as a government regulation of public
discourse.66 These characterizations enable Brennan to use a familiar arsenal
of First Amendment doctrines to decide the case. Brennan attacks section 399
for its "substantial interference with broadcasters' speech, 67 for its content-
based discrimination, 8 for its vagueness,69 for its "patent overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness, for the weakness of its justifications, and for its
failure to accomplish its ends by using "less restrictive means that are readily
available. '72 All of these doctrinal methods are appropriately applied to
regulations of public discourse; none was used in Red Lion because in that
case broadcasters were broadly conceived of as public functionaries.
The specific question of subsidized speech is relevant to only one of the
three predicate acts of characterization that make the decision in League of
Women Voters possible. The case illustrates that although the fact of
government support is relevant to classifying a speaker as within or outside
public discourse, it is not determinative. The subsidy question differs in neither
form nor function from the other issues of characterization posed by the case.
Subsidization is merely one of many possible connections between a speaker
and the state. All of these connections, including subsidization, must be
assessed to determine whether particular speakers in particular circumstances
ought constitutionally to be regarded as independent participants in the
processes of democratic self-governance, and hence whether their speech ought
to receive the First Amendment protections extended to public discourse.
64. Id. at 389.
65. Id. at 394. For a good discussion of the success of this insulation, see YUDOF, supra note 35, at
124-35.
66. For a cross-cultural perspective on this characterization, see MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION: THE
PUBLIC SPHERE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 35 (1995).
67. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 392.
68. See id. at 384.
69. See id. at 392-93.
70. Id. at 396.
71. See id. at 391, 396.
72. Id. at 395.
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Once subsidized editorials are mapped onto the domain of public
discourse, and once section 399's prohibition is characterized as a restriction
of that discourse, Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which focuses only on the
specific issue of subsidy, is radically undermined. Rehnquist argued that
section 399 should be understood as a simple congressional decision "that
public funds shall not be used to subsidize noncommercial, educational
broadcasting stations which engage in 'editorializing.' 713  Reiterating the
theme of his opinion in Regan v. Taxation with Representation,7  Rehnquist
rejected "the notion that, because Congress chooses to subsidize some speech
but not other speech, its exercise of its spending powers is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny."75 But, as we have seen, selective congressional subsidies
of magazines in second-class mail would indeed be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.76 This indicates that the thrust of Rehnquist's dissent is quite beside
the point once the government regulation at issue is characterized as a
restriction on public discourse.
The criteria for establishing whether speech ought to be characterized as
public discourse are complex, contextual, and obscure," and particularly so
in cases of subsidized speech. I am confident that there can be no simple
empirical or descriptive line of demarcation.7 1 Ultimately, speech will be
assigned to public discourse on the basis of normative and ascriptive judgments
as to whether particular speakers in particular contexts should constitutionally
be regarded as autonomous participants in the ongoing process of democratic
self-governance.79 Whether explicitly addressed or not, such judgments are
essential predicates to all cases of subsidized speech.
73. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
75. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 405.
76. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text; cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co % Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983) (holding that use tax on ink and paper targeting small
group of newspapers "places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action"). Strict scrutiny s ould occur
"even where ... there is no evidence of an improper censorial motive - Arkansas Writers' Project. Inc v
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).
77. In the case of broadcasters, for example, the rationale of scarcity, upon w,.hich the Court has
repeatedly relied, is now surely no more than a fiction. See LLCAS A POWE. JR. A,IERtCA%
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 200-09 (1987) Even the Court has itself conic close to
admitting this. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC. 114 S Ct 2445. 2457 (1994). League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n.l I. This implies that the actual rationale for characterizing broadcastcrs as public
trustees has not yet been articulated by the Court.
78. See Post, supra note 20, at 667-84.
79. Although the scarcity rationale presents itself as a simple empirical fact. that fact cannot. escn if
true, itself explain the special quasi-public status conferred on broadcasters. All that follows from scarcitt
is that the state must find some allocation rule to distribute scarce broadcast frequencies One possiblc
allocation would be to sell frequencies on the open market, just as the goverment sells scarce state.oned
land. The owners of frequencies would then be regarded as purely private speakers Such a scenario is
surely possible, which indicates that its rejection must turn on normative considerations rather than on the
bare fact of scarcity.
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II. SUBSIDIZED SPEECH AND MANAGERIAL DOMAINS
Public discourse must be distinguished from domains that I have elsewhere
called "managerial."80 Within managerial domains, the state organizes its
resources so as to achieve specified ends. The constitutional value of
managerial domains is that of instrumental rationality, a value that
conceptualizes persons as means to an end rather than as autonomous agents.
Within managerial domains, therefore, ends may be imposed upon persons.8
Managerial domains are necessary so that a democratic state can actually
achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed upon. Yet managerial
domains are organized along lines that contradict the premises of democratic
self-governance. For this reason, First Amendment doctrine within managerial
domains differs fundamentally from First Amendment doctrine within public
discourse. The state must be able to regulate speech within managerial domains
so as to achieve explicit governmental objectives. Thus the state can
regulate speech within public educational institutions so as to achieve the
purposes of education;8 3 it can regulate speech within the judicial system so
as to attain the ends of justice;' 4 it can regulate speech within the military so
as to preserve the national defense; 85 it can regulate the speech of government
employees so as to promote "'the efficiency of the public services [the
government] performs through its employees'; 6 and so forth.87
As a result of this instrumental orientation, viewpoint discrimination occurs
frequently within managerial domains. To give but a few obvious examples:
the president may fire cabinet officials who publicly challenge rather than
support administration policies; the military may discipline officers who
publicly attack rather than uphold the principle of civilian control over the
armed forces; public defenders who prosecute instead of defend their clients
may be sanctioned; prison guards who encourage instead of condemn drug use
may be chastised. Viewpoint discrimination occurs within managerial domains
whenever the attainment of legitimate managerial objectives requires it.8
I stress this point because if there is one constitutional principle that the
Court has continuously reiterated as restraining the regulation of subsidized
80. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987).
81. See POST, supra note 9, at 4-6, 10-15.
82. See Post, supra note 80, at 1767-75.
83. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM, & MARY L.
REv. 267, 318 (1990) (analyzing instrumental regulation of speech within universities).
84. See Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 169,
201-06 (analyzing instrumental regulation of speech within court system).
85. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980).
86. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)); see Post, supra note 80, at 1814 n.351.
87. For a more detailed analysis of the management of speech within government institutions, see Post,
supra note 80, at 1767-84.
88. For a theoretical discussion of viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic forums, see id. at 1824-32.
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speech, it is that such regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.8 9 Yet it is quite common for subsidized speech to be located
within managerial domains. The general principle forbidding viewpoint
discrimination must therefore be false with respect to such subsidized speech.
A. Viewpoint Discrimination, Subsidized Speech, and Managerial Domains
The Court's recent opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia9° amply displays the confusion caused by the Court's
announced prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. In an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the Court held that "the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the
Government's provision of financial benefits" 91 rendered unconstitutional the
University of Virginia's refusal to extend subsidies to student speech
promoting religious views. But the Court had already held in other contexts
that "[a] university's mission is education" and hence that a public university
is endowed with the "authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible
with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. 9 " A public
university is therefore a managerial domain dedicated to the achievement of
education, and, as one might expect, public universities routinely regulate the
speech of faculty and students in ways required by that mission.
Justice Kennedy, realizing this, used the language of public forum doctrine,
the only doctrinal category currently possessed by the Court capable of
expressing the requirements of managerial domains, to observe that a school
can create a "limited public forum" by reserving its resources "for certain
groups or for the discussion of certain topics. '93 In this way Justice Kennedy
authorized the University of Virginia to distinguish between speakers and
speech as necessary to serve its mission. He thus authorized such
commonsense and necessary practices as chemistry departments' restricting
their grants to students studying chemistry, or English departments' restricting
their grants to students studying English. But, Justice Kennedy insisted, "we
have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination,
which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum,
and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
89. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch Dist.. 113 S Ct 2141. 2147-48
(1993); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540. 548 (1983); S?,IOLLA. supra note 7. at 184
90. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
91. Id. at 2519.
92. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263. 268 n.5 (1981); cf. Hazelwood Sch Dist v Kuhlmecer. 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school ")
(citation omitted). For a fuller analysis of free speech within the university. see Post. supra note 83. at
317-25.
93. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
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impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
",94limitations.
' 9
This distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination is simply
untenable within the context of a managerial domain. In ordinary language, we
would say that a content-based regulation is one that is keyed to the meaning
of speech, whereas a viewpoint-based regulation is one that intervenes into a
specific controversy in order to advantage or disadvantage a particular
perspective or position within that controversy." Justice Kennedy clearly
adopts this sense of the distinction in Rosenberger, for he notes that
"discrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular
instance of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination," and that
in the particular case before him "the University does not exclude religion as
a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic
efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. '96
If the distinction between viewpoint and content discrimination is
understood in this way, however, it is irrelevant to the regulation of speech
within managerial domains. In such settings, speech is necessarily and
routinely constrained on the basis of both its content and its viewpoint.
Academic evaluations of students and faculty are regularly based upon
viewpoint. Historians who deny the Holocaust are not likely to receive
appointments to reputable departments; students who deny the legitimacy of
the taxing power of the federal government are not likely to receive high
grades in law schools. The same principles apply to university decisions
concerning the subsidization of speech. So, for example, no First Amendment
94. Id. at 2517.
95. See Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. RaV. 203,
218 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. RaV.
189, 197-200 (1983); Luba L. Shur, Note, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and
the Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REv. 1665, 1692
(1995).
96. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517. The difference between viewpoint and content discrimination is,
in Justice Kennedy's account, intrinsically unstable and therefore always potentially arbitrary. References
to religious speech may refer to either content or viewpoint discrimination, depending upon the
circumstances that are deemed salient. In the context, say, of a course on the history of religious thought,
the category of "religious speech" may refer merely to the meaning of speech. But in the context of a
dispute between advocates of evolution and partisans of creationism, the category may refer to a particular
viewpoint. It is not the category of religious speech that is determinative, therefore, but the social situation
in which the category is deployed. As Elena Kagan rightly observes:
The very notion of viewpoint discrimination rests on a background understanding of a disputed
issue. If one sees no dispute, one will see no viewpoints, and correspondingly one will see no
viewpoint discrimination in any action the government takes. Similarly, how one defines a
dispute will have an effect on whether one sees a government action as viewpoint
discriminatory.
Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan,
and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REv. 29, 70 (footnote omitted). The
problem with Justice Kennedy's opinion is that he does not explain how to characterize the social situation
in which a regulation is to be categorized as either viewpoint-based or content-based.
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issue would be raised if a graduate student who proposed to study the mythical
combustive element phlogiston were to be refused a research grant by the
chemistry department of a public university, however much the student were
to complain about discrimination against her view of the causes of chemical
reactions. The constitutionality of the refusal would instead turn on whether the
chemistry department's criteria for awarding grants were related to its
legitimate educational mission. That the department had both the purpose and
effect of discriminating against the student's particular viewpoint would
properly be deemed immaterial.
This argument suggests that the Court's effort to distinguish content from
viewpoint discrimination is fundamentally confused, at least within managerial
domains. I suspect that in fact the Court deploys the distinction to express a
quite different point, which can perhaps be understood if one imagines a case
in which a chemistry department awards research grants only to students who
oppose abortion rights. Although we might be tempted to say about this case
that the department's criteria for awarding grants are outrageously viewpoint
discriminatory, what we would actually mean is that the criteria are completely
irrelevant to any legitimate educational objective of the department.
We may hypothesize, then, that the Court's use of the viewpoint/content
distinction, when applied within managerial domains, actually expresses the
difference between those restraints on speech that are instrumentally necessary
to the attainment of legitimate managerial purposes, and those that are not. If
we interpret Rosenberger in this way, we can read the decision as implicitly
resting upon the conclusion that the exclusion of speech promoting religious
views is irrelevant to any legitimate educational purposes served by the
university's grant program. 97 To pursue this question, however, would lead
to a full-scale analysis of constitutionally permissible and impermissible
educational objectives, a path I do not propose now to pursue. 9'
97. There is some language in the opinion that suggests the Court might also have had in mind that
the student speech supported by the grants was part of public discourse and that the grant program was
therefore not part of the managerial operation of the University. The Court refers repeatedly to the
"distinction between the University's own favored message and the pnvate speech of students"
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519. But this characterization of the grant program is contrary to the
University's own assertion that the grants were designed "to support a broad range of extracumeular
student activities that 'are related to the educational purpose of the University Id at 2514 (citation
omitted). In fact, the University of Virginia would have a good deal of explaining to do to the taxpayers
of the state were its program not fashioned to further the University's actual educational relationship with
its students.
A more plausible explanation of the Court's underlying logic. therefore. is that the Court interpreted
the actual justification for the University's exclusion of religious speech to rest on the University's desire
to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The Court's holding that the Establishment Clause would not
be violated by grants subsidizing religious speech removed this rationale, see id. at 2420-24. leaving the
exclusion without managerial justification and hence vulnerable to charactenzation as viewpoint
discrimination.
98. 1 have sketched the outlines of such an analysis elsewhere See Post. supra note 83. at 317-25
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B. Rust v. Sullivan: Subsidized Speech and the Boundaries of Managerial
Domains
Instead I shall turn to the more fundamental issue of the principles that
ought to inform First Amendment decisions to assign subsidized speech to
managerial domains. These principles are of fundamental importance because
First Amendment standards applicable to such domains differ so dramatically
from those governing public discourse. I shall use as the focus of my inquiry
the "extraordinary-some would say shocking-decision" 99  of Rust v.
Sullivan. ioo
Rust was certainly a controversial decision. It sparked hostile hearings in
the United States Senate,'"' fiercely negative public attention,'12  and
sharply critical academic commentary.1 3 It involved a challenge to
regulations issued in 1988 by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to implement Title X of the Public Health Service Act. The Act
authorized HHS to subsidize family planning clinics, but it stated that "'[n]one
of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning."" 4 The regulations
prohibited Title X clinics and their employees from providing "'counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provid[ing]
referral for abortion as a method of family planning."' 05 They also
prohibited Title X clinics and their employees "from engaging in activities that
'encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family
planning.
'" 10 6
99. Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 185.
100. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
101. See Hearings, supra note 40.
102. See Cole, supra note 7, at 684 n.34.
103. For a sample of academic commentary critical of the Rust decision, see SMOLLA, supra note 7,
at 218-19; Cole, supra note 7; Phillip J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's
Free Flow Theory of the First Amendment, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Put. POL'Y 359 (1992);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 7; Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the
Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1579-1612 (1994); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Brind &
Rust v. Sullivan: Free Speech and the Limits of a Written Constitution, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1994);
Thomas Win. Mayo, Abortion and Speech: A Comment, 46 SMU L. REV. 309 (1992); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993); Peter M. Shane, The
Rust That Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585 (1992); Christina
E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v, Sullivan and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1724 (1995); Loye M. Barton, Note, The Policy Against
Federal Funding for Abortions Extends into the Realm of Free Speech After Rust v. Sullivan, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 637 (1992); Ann Brewster Weeks, Note, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and
Publicly Funded Speech, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1623 (1992). But see William W. Van Alstyne, Second Thoughts
on Rust v. Sullivan and the First Amendment, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 5 (1992).
104. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1991)).
105. Id. at 179 (quoting Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(l) (1989)).
106. Id. at 180 (quoting Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)). The
regulations were suspended at the direction of President Bill Clinton in 1993. Clinton observed that the
regulations "endanger[] women's lives and health by preventing them from receiving complete and accurate
medical information and interfere[] with the doctor-patient relationship by prohibiting information that
[Vol. 106: 151
Subsidized Speech
The regulations were attacked under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, because "they condition the receipt of a benefit, in these cases Title
X funding, on the relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right to engage
in abortion advocacy and counseling."'O7 But the Court, citing League of
Women Voters and Regan, defended the regulations on the grounds that "our
'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in which the Government
has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from
engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
program." 10
8
The Court's response to the plaintiffs' unconstitutional conditions argument
is unconvincing. It would be unconstitutional for the government to condition
access to the "subsidy" of second-class mailing privileges on the waiver of all
advocacy of abortion within the mailed matter, even if magazines were free to
advocate abortion outside "the scope of' the United States mail. Whether
restrictions on subsidies apply only to funded speech or generically to
recipients of the subsidies is thus not constitutionally determinative.
The Court could, however, have offered a more convincing response to the
unconstitutional conditions argument. In both League of Women Voters and the
hypothetical case of withdrawing second-class mailing privileges, the speech
at issue can be characterized as public discourse. But it is highly questionable
whether the speech of the Title X clinics and their employees could also be
classified as public discourse. It is in fact superficially plausible to locate that
speech instead within a managerial domain established by Title X.
There is much evidence that the Court in Rust was actually driven by the
perception that the speech restricted by the HHS regulations should be located
in a managerial domain. The Court repeatedly asserted that "[t]he challenged
regulations" do no more than "implement the statutory prohibition .... They
are designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed.""
The argument, if fully articulated, would be that Congress enacted Title X to
accomplish certain purposes, that these purposes are legitimate, and that the
HHS regulations function within this managerial domain to regulate speech so
as to achieve these purposes. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
powerless against this argument, because the doctrine lacks any mechanism for
determining the domain to which speech should be allocated and hence for
adequately describing the nature of the "rights" that are to be protected.
medical professionals are otherwise ethically and legally required to provide to their patients William J
Clinton, President's Memorandum on the Title X *'Gag Rule.- 1993 PtL'. PAPERS 10 (Jan 22. 1993)
107. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
108. Id. at 197.
109. Id. at 193; see also id. at 195 n.4 ('The regulations are designed to ensure compliance with the
prohibition of § 1008 that none of the funds appropriated under Title X be used in a program where
abortion is a method of family planning.").
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The argument, however, is flatly incompatible with the Court's own
precedents that viewpoint discrimination is always and everywhere
unconstitutional. The HHS regulations were plainly guilty of "impermissibly
discriminating based on viewpoint because they prohibit 'all discussion about
abortion as a lawful option-including counseling, referral, and the provision
of neutral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy-while
compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes
continuing a pregnancy to term."' t 0
Faced with this awkward inconsistency, the Court simply blinked. It
rejected the plaintiffs' charge of viewpoint discrimination on the grounds that:
This is not a case of the Government "suppressing a dangerous idea,"
but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from
engaging in activities outside of the project's scope. To hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain
permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals
necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous
Government programs constitutionally suspect."'
Nothing could more vividly illustrate the failure of the Court's purported
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination than this passage. The HHS regulations
plainly discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, if by viewpoint discrimination
is meant, as Justice Kennedy meant in Rosenberger, to constrain speech on
only one side of a disputed subject." 2 By upholding the HHS regulations,
therefore, the Court essentially confessed to the irrelevance of the criterion of
viewpoint discrimination within the context of managerial regimes. It instead
subtly but significantly shifted the meaning of viewpoint discrimination along
the lines that I suggested in our discussion of Rosenberger.tt3 The Court in
Rust in effect stated that regulations within managerial domains would not be
deemed viewpoint discriminatory so long as they were necessary to accomplish
legitimate managerial ends.
If the analysis I have so far offered is correct, therefore, Rust is an entirely
defensible decision so long as it is assumed that the speech restricted by the
HHS regulations is appropriately characterized as located within the boundaries
of a managerial regime dedicated to the achievement of legitimate ends. But
II0. Id. at 192 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at I1, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-
1391)). This was also the basis of much criticism of Rust. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 40, at 19
(statement of Lee C. Bollinger) ("It is one of the most deeply held principles of the First Amendment that
the government not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, and that is what the regulation at issue in Rust
v. Sullivan does."); see also Weeks, supra note 103, at 1658-62 (condemning Rust for viewpoint
discrimination).
11l. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
112. See Cole, supra note 7. at 688 n.47; Wells, supra note 103, at 1730-32; Weeks, supra note 103.
at 1661-62.
113. See supra Section I.A.
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is this assumption well founded? Putting aside the question of whether the
ends of the HHS regulations are legitimate,"' the question I wish to explore
is whether the speech regulated in Rust ought in fact to be assigned to a
managerial domain.
Ultimately the allocation of speech to managerial domains is a question of
normative characterization. What is at stake is whether we wish to consign
speech to a social space where "the attainment of institutional ends is taken as
an unquestioned priority."'"' 5 This represents a serious contraction of our
ordinary understanding of freedom of expression, and it therefore requires
extraordinary justification. I have argued in detail elsewhere that such
restrictions on speech can be justified only where those occupying the relevant
social space actually inhabit roles that are defined by reference to an
instrumental logic.
1 6
So, for example, persons in a government bureaucracy assume various
institutional roles-secretaries, clerks, case workers, supervisors-all defined
by reference to the organizational rationality of the domain. Similarly, persons
within universities act the part of students or professors or graduate teaching
assistants, by which they reveal their acquiescence in the instrumental logic of
education. By contrast, the history of public forum doctrine can be read to
illustrate how courts came to realize that the diversity of roles and expectations
that persons actually bring to their use of government parks and streets
precludes their subjection to state managerial authority. The same point can be
made about the United States mail. Even though the Postal Service is clearly
a government-owned and operated organization, persons have a "practical
dependence ... upon the postoffice [sic],"" 7 so that they assimilate the mail
to the rich and complex spectrum of roles and expectations that they inhabit
in their everyday lives. Thus, while managerial authority over the Postal
Service may be appropriate, that authority does not extend to members of the
general public who use the mail, because, as Justice Holmes famously
observed, "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the
right to use our tongues."'
8
We may ask, then, about the nature of the roles inhabited by persons
regulated by the HI-IS regulations at issue in Rust. For the sake of simplicity,
I shall examine only the core dyadic relationship of physician and patient that
all sides take to be at the center of the case, and I will therefore consider the
constitutionality of those aspects of the HHS regulations that prohibit
114. For arguments that they are not, see Redish & Kessler. supra note 7. at 576-77. Shane. supra
note 103, at 1601-03. For the Court's argument to the contrary, see Rust. 500 U S at 192-93
115. Post, supra note 80, at 1789 (footnote omitted). The argument of this and the follo% ing paragraph
is fully developed in id. at 1788-809.
116. See id.
117. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138. 141 (1922) (Holmes. J.. dissenting)
118. United States ex reL Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co v. Burleson. 255 U S 407, 437
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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physicians from offering advice or referrals about abortion in the course of
their consultations with their patients, even when, in the medical judgment of
the physician, it would be appropriate to do so.
Physicians are of course professionals, and it is well known that
professionals do not fit well into the instrumental rationality of
organizations.' This is fundamentally because professionals must always
qualify their loyalty and commitment to the vertical hierarchy of an
organization by their horizontal commitment to general professional norms and
standards. 120 "[P]rofessionals participate in two systems-the profession and
the organization-and their dual membership places important restrictions on
the organization's attempt to deploy them in a rational manner with respect to
its own goals."'
121
This point has been accepted by the Court in the context of lawyers. Thus,
for example, the Court has held that although a public defender is employed
by the state, the conduct of a public defender does not constitute state action
because
a public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the
same sense as other employees of the State .... [A] defense lawyer
is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an
administrative superior. Held to the same standards of competence and
integrity as a private lawyer ... a public defender works under
canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of
independent judgment on behalf of the client. "A lawyer shall not
permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional
judgment in rendering such legal services."
'122
Although the Court has found, in contrast, that the conduct of a prison
physician does constitute state action, it has justified this holding on the
explicit ground that a doctor's "professional and ethical obligation to make
independent medical judgments [does] not set him in conflict with the State
and other prison authorities."'' 2 3 This obligation to make independent medical
judgments124 sets limits to the managerial authority of a physician's
119. See PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD Scorr, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 62-63 (1962); see also
ROY G. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. STONE, SERVICE AND PROCEDURE IN BUREAUCRACY 154-56 (1956)
(discussing competing principles of bureaucracy and professionalism).
120. For a good discussion, see W. Richard Scott, Professionals in Bureaucracies-Areas of Conflict,
in PROFESSIONALIZATION 265-75 (Howard M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1966).
121. ld. at 266.
122. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1976)).
123. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51 (1988).
124. "Medical ethics as well as medical practice dictate independent judgment ... on the part of the
doctor." Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RuToERS
L.J. 947, 987 (1964); cf. FRANCIS & STONE, supra note 119, at 156 (arguing that in professional mode of
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employer, just as it does to the managerial authority of a lawyer's employer,
because "[a] physician's professional ethics require that he have 'free and
complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill."'"I "If the employer
were to control the independent judgment in the decisionmaking process and
the performance of the professional's duties, the employer's control might
conflict with the professional's primary and unequivocal duty to exercise his
or her independent judgment."'
I26
It is far from clear, then, that physicians, even if they have accepted
employment in Title X clinics, occupy roles defined by reference to a purely
organizational logic, particularly in situations where that logic seeks to override
the necessary exercise of independent professional judgment. And this is of
course precisely what the HHS regulations attempted to do.' 7
organization highly skilled professionals must be responsible for their decisions and able to perform on their
own).
125. Lurch v. United States, 719 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS § 6, reprinted in AMERICAN MED. ASS'N JUDICIAL COUNCIL. OPINIONS AND REPORTS 5 (1977))
The physician's duty to exercise independent judgment ultimately stems from the basic prnciple that "[tlhe
patient's welfare and best interests must be the physician's main concern. The physician's obligations
to the patient remain unchanged even though the patient-physician relationship may be affected by the
health care delivery system or the patient's state." American College of Ph'sicians Ethics Manual i 3d eI ).
reprinted in 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 947. 948 (1992) [hereinafter Ethics Manual]. see also Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Am. Med. Ass'n. Ethical Issues in Managed Carr. 273 JAMA 330. 331
(1995) ("The foundation of the patient-physician relationship is the trust that physicians are dedicated first
and foremost to serving the needs of their patients.").
126. Quilico v. Kaplan, 749 F.2d 480, 484-85 (7th Cir 1984). accord Ezekiel % Michel. 66 F3d 894.
902 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Elach and every licensed physician ... must fulfill his ethical obligations to exercise
independent judgment when providing treatment and patient care . "); L lly v Fieldstone. 876 F 2d 857.
859 (10th Cir. 1989) ("It is uncontroverted that a physician must have discretion to care for a patient and
may not surrender control over certain medical details."); Kelley v Rossi. 481 N.E 2d 1340. 1343 (Mass
1985) (affirming importance of physician discretion). Justice Holmes. with characteristic pith. stated the
point in this way: "'There is no more distinct calling than that of the doctor, and none in shich the
employee is more distinctly free from the control or direction of his employer" Pearl % West End St Ry.
176 Mass. 177, 179 (1900).
127. It is clear that there is a potential conflict between the HHS regulations and ethical medical
practice. Doctors are under an "ethical duty to disclose relevant information about reproduction ITIlhe
physician does have a duty to assure that the patient is offered information on the full range of
options .... Ethics Manual, supra note 125, at 950. "A pregnant woman should be fully informed tn a
balanced manner about all options, including raising the child herself, placing the child for adoption, and
abortion.... The professional should make every effort to avoid introducing personal bias" AMERICANi
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG). STATENIENT Or POIC'Y 2 (Jan 1993). see
ACOG, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 61 (1989); ACOG. STATtE.'T OF POLICY
FURTHER ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INDUCED ABORTION 3 (Dec. 1977): COUNCIL Os ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS wmt ANNOTATIO.S
§ 8.08 (1994) ("The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the
therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practce.").
The Court's assertion that "the Title X program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the
doctor-patient relationship." Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173. 200 (1991). can properly be said to border on
the "disingenuous." Cole, supra note 7, at 692; see Rust. 500 U.S. at 211 n 3 (Blackmun. J . dissenting)
The Court supports its assertion on two grounds. It states, first, that the HHS regulations do not require "a
doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold " Rust. 500 U S at 200 While this
may be true, the regulations do prevent doctors from offeong information that may be medically relevant
and necessary to disclose. The Court states, second, that the "doctor-patient relationship established by the
Title X program [is not] sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the pan of the
patient of comprehensive medical advice." Id. This assertion, however, merely assumes %%hat must be
demonstrated, which is that the physician-patient relationship within a Title X clinic is so obviously
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We would reach the same conclusion if the issue were analyzed from the
perspective of the patient. The expectations of patients are symmetrical to
those of physicians. In a world where physicians routinely exercise
independent judgment, patients come to expect and rely upon that judgment.
Those served by Title X clinics adopt the role of patients and hence signal
their expectation that they will receive competent and responsible professional
service. Except in the most unusual of circumstances, patients expect the
independent judgment of their physicians to trump inconsistent managerial
demands.
If this analysis is correct, the Court in Rust lacked justification for its
implicit decision to allocate medical counselling to the managerial domain of
the Title X clinic. Neither the role of physician nor that of patient warrant any
inference of acceptance of such a purely instrumental orientation.'28 For this
reason, the viewpoint discrimination inherent in the HHS regulations cannot
be justified by reference to managerial authority.
The matter is complicated, however, because the HHS regulations
constrain private conversations between doctors and patients, and this speech
is plainly not part of public discourse. It is therefore not self-evident that
viewpoint discrimination is automatically forbidden. The matter can perhaps
best be conceptualized as a regulation of professional speech. Sometimes such
regulation is equivalent to the direction of professional practice. There is, for
example, no constitutional difference between forbidding doctors from
prescribing a certain drug and forbidding them from using it. In such a case,
the First Amendment probably does not impose any distinctive constraints on
the state's general power to regulate the practice of medicine. But the HHS
regulations pose a different constitutional problem, for they are aimed
specifically and explicitly at prohibiting the disclosure of information; they are
not directed at medical practice. 29 There was never any question or
possibility that doctors at Title X clinics would actually perform abortions.
What the HHS regulations seek to interdict is the provision of facts about the
possibility or availability of abortion as a family planning option.
subordinated to managerial imperatives that it no longer conforms to ordinary understandings of that
relationship. Although such an alteration is certainly possible, it is also most unusual, and the Court offers
no evidence to support its claim that it has occurred within Title X clinics. A modicum of social awareness
would surely dictate a different conclusion. See Cole, supra note 7, at 692; Roberts, supra note 103, at
598-600.
128. That is not to say, of course, that the government would be barred from creating special clinics
in which all concerned were clear that what appeared at first blush to be "physicians" were actually merely
state employees, fully subject to an administrative direction competent to override good and ethically
required medical practice. The First Amendment would not constitutionally prohibit such a scheme. What
the First Amendment forbids is the attempt to hire what all concerned understand to be physicians and then
to attempt to regulate their speech as though they were merely employees.
129. I realize that this distinction is a matter of degree, because good medical practice often requires
the provision of information. As used in this Essay, however, the distinction goes primarily to the
justification for government regulation.
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The First Amendment is surely implicated whenever the state seeks to
proscribe the flow of information qua information.'" Although there is at
present no well-developed doctrine setting forth the exact test to be used to
evaluate viewpoint discriminatory regulations of this type in the context of
professional speech,' 31 it would be fair to say that the First Amendment
should at a minimum require that any such restriction have a substantial
justification. The most obvious justification, and the only one actually
articulated by the Court in Rust, is that the government wished to create family
planning clinics that did not include abortion, and that the HHS regulations
served this end.1 32 But if my argument is correct that physician-patient
relationships in Title X clinics are not subject to automatic managerial
direction, this justification is constitutionally insufficient. The mere fact that
the government has used subsidies to accomplish a purpose ought not to
provide adequate constitutional grounds for the kind of restrictions at issue in
Rust.
Viewpoint discriminatory regulations that prohibit the dissemination of
information are ordinarily justified by a showing that the foreclosed
information will lead to some harm that the government has a right to prevent.
Thus if the government were to prohibit doctors subsidized by the Veterans
Administration from discussing a certain drug, the constitutionality of the
prohibition would normally turn on some showing that the drug was harmful
and that the provision of information would increase the likelihood of harm.
But this whole class of justifications seems unavailable to the government in
Rust, because they would require that the government characterize abortion as
a positive harm. The right to choose abortion is constitutionally protected,
however, on the grounds that its exercise is "central to personal dignity and
autonomy." 133 Surely the solecism of characterizing the exercise of such a
right as a harm is both obvious and fatal.'3
130. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Inc.. 425 U S. 748.
770 (1976); David A. Strauss, Persuasion. Autonom); and Freedom of Expression. 91 COLU.. L REv 334.
355-59 (1991); Wells, supra note 103. at 1764 ("If the First Amendment stands for anything, it stands for
the principle that the government cannot 'deliberately denyl information to people for the purpose of
influencing their behavior."' (quoting Strauss, supra, at 355)); see also 44 UIquormart. Inc v. Rhode Island.
116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507-08, 1510-14 (1996) (plurality opinion).
131. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Potient Discourse and the Right
to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 201 (1994): Robert D. Goldstein. Reading Casey
Structuring the Woman's Decisionnaking Process, 4 W,. & MARY BILL Rts. J. 787. 852-74 (1996).
132. Nor did the government suggest any other justification for the Title X regulations- See Brief for
Respondent, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391).
133. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 851 (1992).
134. The Court in Rust repeatedly refers to Maher it Roe. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). as standing for the
proposition that the state can choose to subsidize "'services related to childbirth" but not "nontherapeutic
abortions," because "the government may 'make a value judgment favonng childbirth over abortion.
and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."' Rust. 500 U.S at 192-93 (quoting
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (omission in original)). The argument in this Essay is not inconsistent with this
proposition; it merely requires us to make the distinction between government decisions refusing to fund
the medical practice of abortion, because childbirth is viewed as a positive good. and government decisions
19961
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In fact, without purporting to do a complete analysis of the HHS
regulations, I do not see how the regulations can be supported by any
convincing justifications. My tentative conclusion would therefore be that the
regulations ought to be found unconstitutional. The larger point I wish to
stress, however, is that a proper analysis of the case requires a firm
appreciation of both the power and limits of managerial domains within First
Amendment jurisprudence. The fact that Rust involves subsidized speech is
largely secondary.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHARACTERIZATIONS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
There is an important and controversial class of cases in which the fact of
government subsidization is central to constitutional analysis. These cases do
not turn on the assignment of speech to particular social domains, but depend
instead on the characterization of government action. The essential question
posed by these cases is whether conditions on government subsidies should be
classified as regulations imposed upon persons, or whether they should instead
be classified as internal directives guiding the conduct of state institutions. The
topic is large and complex, and at best I will be able to offer only a few
preliminary observations. These can most usefully be developed in the context
of the specific issues raised by the recent controversy surrounding
congressional restrictions on grants to artists offered by the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA).
135
precluding the dissemination of information about abortion, because abortion is viewed as a positive harm.
For an interesting discussion of abortion as a "vice," see Wells, supra note 103, at 1758-62.
135. For a sample of the literature discussing the NEA controversy, see Cole, supra note 7, at 739-43
(arguing that NEA funding restrictions undermine First Amendment); Elizabeth E. DeGrazia, In Search of
Artistic Excellence: Structural Reform of the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 133 (1994) (suggesting structural reforms to grantmaking authority of NEA); Owen M. Fiss, State
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991) (analyzing exercise of state power in context
of Mapplethorpe controversy and NEA); John E. Frohnmayer, Giving Offense, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1
(1993-94) (discussing NEA controversy); Jesse Helms, Tax-Paid Obscenity, 14 NOVA L. REV. 317 (1990)
(same); Robert M. O'Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic Freedom, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1990, at 177 (criticizing NEA funding restrictions as violation of freedom of expression); Amy Sabrin,
Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE
L.J. 1209 (1993) (analyzing meaning of "content" in context of NEA controversy); Lionel S. Sobel, First
Amendment Standards for Government Subsidies of Artistic and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist, 41 VAND. L. REv. 517 (1988) (arguing that First Amendment imposes standards by
which courts may evaluate constitutionality of government subsidies of cultural and artistic expression);
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 610-15 (analyzing First Amendment implications of government funding of
arts); MaryEllen Kresse, Comment, Turmoil at the National Endowment for the Arts: Can Federally Funded
Art Survive the "Mapplethorpe Controversy"?, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 231 (1991) (analyzing Mapplethorpe
controversy); George S. Nahitchevansky, Note, Free Speech and Government Funding: Does the
Government Have to Fund What It Doesn't Like, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 213 (1990) (arguing that funding
decisions should be accorded higher standard of review as their restrictive effect increases); cf Alvam
Ignacio Anillo, Note, The National Endowment for the Humanities: Control of Funding Versus Academic
Freedom, 45 VAND. L. REV. 455 (1992) (discussing similar issues surrounding National Endowment for
the Humanities grants to scholars).
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A. The NEA Controversy: Constitutional Characterizations of Funding
Criteria
Congress created the NEA in 1965 "to develop and promote a broadly
conceived national policy of support for the ... arts in the United States."'
1
6
The NEA is authorized to award grants to "individuals of exceptional talent
engaged in or concerned with the arts."' 137 By statute, applications for grants
must be submitted "in accordance with regulations issued and procedures
established" by the NEA Chair.3 Although the NEA attempted to insulate
these procedures "from partisan political considerations"'39 by ceding de
facto authority to "panels of experts, usually peers of the applicant consisting
of museum professionals or artists involved in the same discipline,"'" the
work of artists subsidized by the NEA came under severe ideological attack
in the late 1980s.
141
The upshot was that Congress eventually qualified the NEA's granting
authority, providing that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria
by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public." 142 In 1992 this qualification was challenged by four individual
performance artists, as well as by the National Association of Artists'
Organizations. In Finley v. NEA, 4 3 a federal district court declared the
"'decency' clause ... void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment and...
overbroad under the First Amendment."'
The constitutional issues posed by Finley contrast neatly with those
presented by League of Women Voters. The decisive question in League of
Women Voters was whether the editorials of noncommercial broadcasters
should be characterized as public discourse. Once this question was answered
136. 20 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1994).
137. Id. § 954(c).
138. Id. § 954(d).
139. Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts Free Erpression and Politcal Control. 103
HARV. L. REv. 1969, 1972 (1990).
140. Fiss, supra note 135, at 2094. For a good descnplion. sme DeGrazza. supra note 135. at 139-41
141. In 1989, Congress passed a temporary restrtction on grants funded during fiscal )ear 1990.
providing that grants could not be extended to support work "which in the judgment of the National
Endowment for the Arts ... may be considered obscene, including but not limited to. depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitatton of children. or indi'.duals engaged in scx acts and
which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious Itterary. artistic. political, or scientilic %alue " Act of
Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701. 741 (1990) The certification procedure used
by the NEA to enforce the restrictions of this section was declared unconstitutional in Bella Leiu tt. Dance
Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
142. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994). The statute also declared that "obscenity is sithout artistic merit.
is not protected speech, and shall not be funded." Id. § 954(d)(2) For a good history of these ecnt. see
John H. Garvey. Black and Whire Images. LAw & CoNmsiP. PROBS. Autumn 1993. at 189 (1993) In this
Essay I do not examine the restrictions on NEA granting authority imposed by § 954(d)(2)
143. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992). An appeal of Fnle" is still pending
144. Id. at 1476.
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affirmatively, it was relatively unproblematic to characterize section 399's
prohibition as directly restricting public discourse. In Finley, however, the
artistic work supported by NEA grants may for the most part
unproblematically be regarded as part of public discourse.14 5 But by contrast
it is not at all clear whether the decency clause struck down by Finley should
be understood as a direct regulation of the speech of NEA grantees, or instead
as a rule directed at the internal operation of the NEA.t 46 Unlike League of
Women Voters, therefore, Finley poses the question of how to characterize
government action.
An analogous ambiguity of characterization would arise if, for example,
Congress were to enact a statute prohibiting "indecent" magazines from
receiving the subsidy of second-class mailing privileges. Accepting as
uncontroversial premises that the Postal Service is an organization subject to
direction by Congress, that those using the mail must comply with postal
regulations, and that magazines flowing through the mail are public discourse,
we must nevertheless face the question of how the ban on indecent magazines
should be characterized: as a regulation of public discourse or as a rule
directed at the internal operation of the Post Office.
The question exposes an unexplored assumption in the way in which I
have so far presented the relationship between public discourse and managerial
domains. I have spoken as if one could draw a sharp distinction between the
state and its citizens, as though the realm of democratic self-determination
functioned in isolation from systems of government intervention and support.
But of course this is not the case under contemporary conditions; instrumental
organizations of government presently infiltrate almost all aspects of social life.
Organizational theorists have long recognized that institutional boundaries are
open and porous. "The organization is the total set of interstructured activities
in which it is engaged at any one time and over which it has discretion to
initiate, maintain, or end behaviors.... The organization ends where its
discretion ends and another's begins."' 47 For this reason one can always ask
whether the internal rules of a state organization should constitutionally be
categorized as equivalent to the regulation of ambient domains of social life.
We would almost certainly view a statute barring indecent magazines from
second-class mailing subsidies as a direct regulation of public discourse rather
than as an internal guideline of the Post Office. To appropriate the vocabulary
of Meir Dan-Cohen, we would classify it as a "conduct rule" for the
145. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 (1995);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
146. To paraphrase Laurence Tribe, it is not clear whether the decency clause is an instance of the
government's adding its own voice or whether it is an example of the state's silencing the voices of others.
See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 807.
147. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS 32
(1978).
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government of citizens, rather than as a "decision rule" for the internal
direction of government officials."'S I strongly suspect that our reason for
doing so is that magazines are so completely dependent on the operation of the
mail that the statute would as a practical matter function to disable magazines
branded as indecent.'49 In such a case we might even go so far as to agree
with Owen Fiss's observation that "the effect of a denial" of a subsidy "is
roughly equivalent to that of a criminal prosecution. '
But this equivalence, if it exists, is practical, not theoretical. It derives
from the particular way in which subsidies for second-class mailing privileges
have infiltrated their social environment. We can easily imagine
counterexamples. Consider, for instance, the Kennedy Center, which the federal
government subsidizes to "present classical and contemporary music, opera,
drama, dance, and other performing arts."' ' ' These criteria for the allocation
of subsidies exclude political and academic speech. Such speech is of course
public discourse, yet its dependence upon the Center is so slight that we would
not be tempted to read the effects of the government's exclusions as "roughly
equivalent to that of a criminal prosecution." We would interpret the
exclusions instead as decision rules for the internal direction of the Center's
administrators. The exclusions would be constitutionally characterized as
instrumental regulations confined to a managerial domain, rather than as
general regulations of public discourse.'
52
Cases of subsidized speech thus typically raise two independent issues of
constitutional characterization. The first refers to the characterization of speech,
and it requires us to determine whether subsidized speech is within public
discourse or whether it is within some other constitutional domain. The second
refers to the characterization of government action, and it requires us to
determine whether standards allocating state subsidies should be regarded as
conduct rules or as decision rules.
The characterization of government action entails judgments that are
contextual and multidimensional. The nature of the action is certainly one
factor to be considered. It matters whether a government allocation rule
148. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984). Kathleen Sullivan uses the vocabulary of "socreign regulator" and
"private art patron" to capture this distinction. See Kathleen M. Sullivan. Artistic Freedom, Public Funding,
and the Constitution, in PUBLIC MONEY AND THE MUSE: ESSAYS O'N GOVER"%'tE:,T FLDI"\G FOR T111,
ARTS 80, 82 (Stephen Benedict ed., 1991).
149. Cf. Milton C. Cummings. Jr.. To Change a Notion's Cultural Polic Th A'enned% Admimitratton
and the Arts in the United States. 1961-1963, in PUBLIC POLICY AND TIlE ARTS 141. 141 tKc% in V
Mulcahy & C. Richard Swaim eds., 1982) (claiming that second-class postal rate was "profoundly important
for" and "a major cause of' growth of American magazines)
150. Fiss, supra note 135, at 2097.
151. 20 U.S.C. § 76j (1994); see Arkansas Writers' Project. Inc %_ Ragland. 481 U S 221. 238 11987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. This would be true even if the restrictions would in a particular case ha%e the effect of making
"work unavailable to the general . . .public." Fiss. supra note 135. at 2097. The decisise question would
be the effect of the restrictions on the relevant aspects of public discourse, not on particular speakers
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actually forbids behavior (like section 399 in League of Women Voters) or
whether it simply constrains the provision of a subsidy (like the statute
establishing the Kennedy Center). The former appears far more analogous to
the regulation of conduct than the latter. Also relevant are the many
considerations identified in the rich academic discussion of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Seth Kreimer's herculean efforts to assess the allocation
of government benefits by reference to the triple baselines of "history,"
"equality," and "prediction" strike me as indispensable.'53 Kreimer's
baselines reveal, for example, how subsidies can come to be experienced like
entitlements because they have become so integrated into the fabric of
everyday life. The case of the traditional public forum illustrates how we tend
to characterize standards allocating such "entitlements" as conduct rules. 54
Kathleen Sullivan's magisterial explication of the ways in which the allocation
of government benefits "determine the overall distribution of power between
government and rightholders generally"'' 55 is equally indispensable. Sullivan's
work underscores situations in which public discourse has become practically
dependent upon government organizations. Thus the symbiotic connection of
magazine publications to second-class mailing subsidies helps to explain why
we tend to characterize the allocation of such subsidies as direct regulations
of public discourse.
B. The Constitutional Distinction Between Conduct Rules and Decision Rules
We must decide, therefore, how the NEA "decency clause" should be
characterized: as a conduct rule directly regulating public discourse or instead
as a decision rule directing NEA officials to intervene in public discourse to
achieve a distinct objective. It is noteworthy that the court in Finley does not
explore this question. It instead merely assumes that because artistic expression
is part of public discourse, the decency clause ought to be regarded as
equivalent to the regulation of public discourse. The court characterizes the
clause as an attempt "to suppress speech that is offensive to some in
society."'' 56 Finley therefore uses standard First Amendment doctrines
prohibiting vagueness and overbreadth to conclude that the clause is
unconstitutional. The conclusion is indeed unobjectionable on the assumption
that these doctrines are appropriately applied, but this assumption would not
153. Kreimer, supra note 30, at 1351-74.
154. See id. at 1359-63.
155. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1490.
156. Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (N.D. Cal. 1992). For a similar perspective on the
restrictions on NEA grants imposed by the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989), see Carl F. Stychin. Identities,
Sexualities, and the Postmodern Subject: An Analysis of Artistic Funding by the National Endowment for
the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 128-31 (1994).
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be correct if the decency clause were to be categorized as a decision rule for
the guidance of NEA decisionmakers.
The doctrine of vagueness, for example, is not ordinarily enforced in the
context of decision rules, for "[t]he rule as to a definite standard of action is
not so strict in cases of the delegation of legislative power to executive boards
and officers."'' 57 This can be seen most dramatically in the context of the
FCC, which is authorized by statute to grant, review, and modify licenses
subject to the highly indeterminate standard of "public convenience, interest,
or necessity."'' 5 1 It would surely be strange to hold that a "decency" standard
is unconstitutionally vague, but that a "public interest" standard is not.
The Finley court's appeal to overbreadth theory would be similarly
problematic if the decency clause were to be regarded as a decision rule.
Finley correctly cites precedents standing for the proposition that conduct rules
designed to censor indecent public discourse should be struck down as
unconstitutionally overbroad.' 59 These precedents, however, do not control
with regard to decision rules that administer managerial domains. We know,
for example, that within managerial domains, the Supreme Court has
specifically upheld the proscription of "indecent" speech where it has deemed
such regulation necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate purposes. The
inculcation of "the habits and manners of civility" within a high school has
been held to constitute one such purpose. '6 If the NEA decency clause is
seen as a decision rule, the precise constitutional question posed, therefore, is
whether the government can organize itself in order to intervene in public
discourse so as to promote the value of decency. This is a difficult question
that must be directly and substantively analyzed; it cannot be settled by
offhand references to overbreadth.
This analysis suggests that significant constitutional consequences follow
from the classification of the NEA decency clause as a conduct rule or as a
decision rule. To conceptualize the clause as a conduct rule regulating public
discourse is to subject it to the usual First Amendment standards restricting
such regulations. What is striking, however, is that these standards would
render unconstitutional not merely the clause itself, but also the larger criterion
of "artistic excellence." It would be flatly unconstitutional for the state to
regulate public discourse in a way that penalizes art deemed insufficiently
157. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 41 (1924). For a good discussion of the vagueness doctrine in the
context of decision rules, see Edward L. Rubin. Law and Legislatin in the Administrative State. 89
COLUM. L. REv. 369. 397-408 (1989).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994). For the Supreme Courts unsympathetic responsc to the charge that
the standard is unconstitutionally vague. see NBC v. United States. 319 U.S. 190. 225-26 (1943). FCC v
Pottsville Broad. Co.. 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940): see also Red Lion Broad. Co v FCC. 395 U S 367.
379-80 (1969) (discussing statutory authority of FCC to promulgate regulations)
159. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475-76.
160. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675. 681 (1986).
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excellent. 16' Imagine, for example, a congressional statute that seeks to
improve public culture by excluding from second-class mailing subsidies
magazines with short stories deemed by the Postal Service inadequate when
measured by a standard of "artistic excellence."
The most general statement of this point is that regulations of public
discourse must meet stringent criteria of neutrality to ensure that public
discourse is not subordinated to community values, and NEA grant criteria
would be no exception. To conceptualize the criteria as regulations of public
discourse would therefore probably impose upon the NEA the obligation to
"parcel out its limited budget on a purely content-neutral, first-come-first-
served basis as governments must do in allocating use of a public forum.'
' 62
Such an obligation would create powerful disincentives for the investment of
government support, because that support could no longer be oriented toward
the advancement of specific values.
163
First Amendment analysis would follow a very different trajectory,
however, if we were to classify the NEA decency clause as a decision rule,
which is to say as an internal policy guideline directing the NEA to intervene
into public discourse to encourage and facilitate excellent art that is also
decent.' 64 The state may participate in public discourse to accomplish
purposes that the First Amendment forbids the state from seeking to
161. A central principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is that public discourse cannot be regulated
in ways that censor speech to enforce community standards. See POST, supra note 9, at 134-96. It is
because of this principle that a conduct rule imposing a "decency" standard would be found
unconstitutional. But this principle would also require that a conduct rule imposing an "excellence" standard
be found unconstitutional.
162. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475; see YUDOF, supra note 35, at 234-35. The Court in Finley
ineffectually tries to escape this conclusion by analogizing "funding for the arts to funding of public
universities." Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475. The court reasoned that:
In both settings, limited public funds are allocated to support expressive activities, and some
content-based decisions are unavoidable.... Hiring and promotion decisions based on
professional evaluations of academic merit are permissible in a public university setting, but
decisions based on vague criteria or intended to suppress unpopular expression are not.
Analogously, professional evaluations of artistic merit are permissible, but decisions based on
the wholly subjective criterion of "decency" are not.
Id. (citations omitted). Even if we put to one side the court's strange notion that a criterion of "decency"
is "wholly subjective" in ways that a criterion of "artistic excellence" is not, the court's attempt to equate
the NEA with a public university is fundamentally incompatible with its desire to characterize and assess
the decency clause as a conduct rule addressed to public discourse. This is because public universities are
managerial domains dedicated to the purpose of education, see supra Section I.A, which is why universities
may regulate speech in a "content-based" manner designed to accomplish heuristic purposes.
163. See YUDOF, supra note 35, at 242-43. In light of this conclusion it is fascinating to note that with
respect to both public fora and the United States mail, where allocation rules for government subsidies are
unproblematically characterized as conduct rules, it is neither practically nor politically feasible for the
government to withdraw its subsidies.
164. Government efforts to intervene in public discourse can of course infringe upon many different
constitutional provisions. Such efforts, for example, may violate the Establishment Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. They may be arbitrary and irrational and thus run afoul of the Constitution's hostility
to "naked preferences." See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLM. L. REv.
1689 (1984). In this Essay, I consider only those restrictions that would be specifically placed on the
decency clause, viewed as a decision rule, by the freedom of speech provisions of the First Amendment.
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accomplish directly by regulating public discourse.16 5 Thus the government
can operate the Kennedy Center to encourage "music, opera, drama, dance, and
other performing arts," although it could not directly regulate public discourse
to accomplish the same end. 66 Even if the state cannot directly regulate
public discourse so as "to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the
public,"' 67 the FCC can nevertheless constitutionally establish a managerial
domain that includes broadcasters, and it can promulgate the fairness doctrine
within that domain in order to serve the purpose of ensuring that "the public
receive ... suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences."'' 68 Or, to bring the matter closer to the precise question that
we are discussing, the state can surely intervene into public discourse to
promote "excellent art," whether through the establishment of public orchestras
or museums or through the provision of NEA grants, even if the government
could not directly regulate public discourse to achieve that purpose.
So long as the allocation criteria for state subsidies are conceptualized as
decision rules addressed to the administrators of state organizations, they can
be justified by reference to a far broader array of purposes than would be
permissible if they were regarded as conduct rules regulating public
discourse. 169 The basic reason for this asymmetry is that the state is
prohibited from imposing any particular conception of collective identity when
it regulates public discourse,10 but the state must perforce exemplify a
particular conception of collective identity when it acts on its own account.''
Just as the President can speak out in favor of a particular vision of community
values, 72 so can the government organize itself through institutions to
support and nourish that vision.
165. The Supreme Court has explicitly drawn an analogous conclusion in the area of the dormant
Commerce Clause, holding that the government may aim at certain purposes %,hcn it acts as a 'market
participant" that are prohibited to it when acting as a "market regulator." See Reeves. Inc v Stake. 447
U.S. 429, 436-40 (1980).
166. Thus a state which permitted "music, opera. drama. dance, and other performing arts" to be
performed in a park that was a public forum could not simultaneously exclude academic or political speech
167. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241. 247-48 (1974) (footnote omitted)-
168. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367.390 (1969); see Metro Broad.. Inc v FCC. 497 U S
547, 566 (1990) (endorsing FCC regulation aimed at increasing broadcast diversity), overruled in part by
Adarand Constructors Co. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097. 2111 (1995).
169. A contrary conclusion would prohibit most constructive interventions by an activist state See
generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECt 230 (1993)
170. See Post, supra note 17, at 1114-23.
171. See. e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Umv. of Va., 115 S Ct 2510. 2519 (1995).
Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags. Monuments. and State Holidays. and the
Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society. 70 CHi.-KENT L REv 1079 (1995) (arguing
that state inevitably supports public symbols that carry particular ideological messages)
172. As Melville Nimmer once observed, "Surely there is something fundamentally wrong with a
doctrine that would find presumptively illegitimate Theodore Roosevelt's view of the presidency as a 'bully
pulpit,' and Franklin Roosevelt's exercise of leadership via the 'fireside chat.' Our gocminent officials
are properly expected to lead as well as to reflect public opinion." MELVIt.E B NistmiER. NiMlER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 4.09[D], at 4-96-97 (1984).
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The constitutional importance of empowering the state to express and
sustain shared beliefs is what I believe Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to
express in his often-cited observation in Regan that "a legislature's decision
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right."'173 Although Rehnquist's formulation is unfortunately overbroad and
decontextualized, the core of his insight is that when the government is
authorized to act in its own name as a representative of the community, its
decision to promote one value cannot by itself carry an internal constitutional
compulsion simultaneously to support other values. 74
It follows from this conclusion that viewpoint discrimination alone will
never be a sufficient ground for striking down decision rules.'75 Whenever
the state acts to support a particular conception of community identity, it will
engage in viewpoint discrimination with respect to that conception. So, for
example, if the NEA allocates grants to support artistic excellence, it must
adopt a perspective about the meaning of that value; if the value is contested,
the NEA's perspective will necessarily be viewpoint discriminatory from the
standpoint of those who hold a different interpretation of the value.
76
C. First Amendment Limitations on Decision Rules
We now face something of a conundrum, however, for if decision rules
that guide government interventions into public discourse can exemplify and
advance particular community values, and if they can therefore discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint, what general First Amendment limitations, if any, can
be applied to them? The only plausible source for such limitations would lie
in what I have elsewhere called the "collectivist" theory of the First
Amendment, which was the basis of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Red
Lion.177 In that case the Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of the
FCC's fairness doctrine should be assessed in terms of its consistency with
"the ends and purposes of the First Amendment," which the Court defined in
173. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
174. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 39, at 698 (recognizing necessity of government expression);
Cole, supra note 7, at 702-03 (emphasizing importance of government freedom to control content of its
speech); Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization: How NEA Art Funding Abridges Private Speech,
40 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 451 (1992) (recognizing government's nonneutral promotion of ideas); Redish
& Kessler, supra note 7, at 560-62 (expressing importance of government's role as educator and
communicator).
175. Needless to say, traditional academic opinion is strongly to the contrary. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra
note 7, at 196 (characterizing straightforward viewpoint discrimination as constitutionally invalid); O'Ncil,
supra note 135, at 191 (same); Sobel, supra note 135, at 525 (same); Sullivan, supra note 148, at 89-90
(same); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 611-12 (same). But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 231-32 (setting
out permissible parameters of viewpoint discrimination).
176. For a discussion of the viewpoint discriminatory aspects of current NEA funding criteria, see
PRICE, supra note 66, at 184-86; Daniel Shapiro, Free Speech and Art Subsidies, 14 LAW & PHIL. 329,
346-53 (1995).
177. See Post, supra note 17, at 1114-23.
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terms of the necessity to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" and
to ensure that the public "receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral and other ideas and experiences." '' Surely decision rules inconsistent
with these ends and purposes ought to be unconstitutional.
Red Lion, however, involved the regulatory authority of the state. At issue
was the FCC's promulgation of rules restricting the expression of broadcasters,
albeit that the broadcasters' speech was itself regarded as outside of public
discourse. Even on the assumption that direct managerial regulation of
expression should be unconstitutional if it unduly constricts the diversity and
vigor of broadcasters' speech,'79 it is not apparent how this conclusion can
be translated to the context of decision rules that do not directly regulate
speech but instead serve as guidelines for government intervention into public
discourse.
Consider, for example, the difficulty we would face in applying the Red
Lion standard to the subsidies at issue in Finley. In contrast to regulation,
subsidies create speech. By hypothesis each subsidy that is awarded increases
the absolute quantity of public discourse.' How, then, could granting
subsidies ever be construed as constricting expression? To apply Red Lion,
therefore, we would have to interpret the collectivist theory as prohibiting not
merely the outright reduction of speech, but also the distortion of public
discourse. Subsidies that emphasize one perspective or another, one value or
another, might be thought to skew public discourse, to deform artificially its
natural diversity and spontaneous heterogeneity, and to be unconstitutional for
these reasons.
The problem with this line of analysis, however, is that it is not obvious
how to give useful content to the concept of "distortion" once it is accepted
that the government may allocate grants to support particular values. Every
178. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969)
179. For example, an FCC rule prohibiting broadcasters from cocnng the Whiteu ater scandal % ould
surely be unconstitutional because its purpose and effect would be to restict the marketplace of ideas. even
if broadcasters' speech is not regarded as part of public discourse.
180. Martin Redish and Daryl Kessler acutely observe that subsidies are sometimes provided on the
condition that a recipient refrain from speaking in ways that the recipient vould. in the absence of the
subsidy, be free and able to do. They refer to this phenomenon as "'negative subsidies" and convincingly
argue that such subsidies should be regarded with constitutional suspicion. Redish & Kessler. supra note
7, at 558-59; see SMOLLA, supra note 7. at 189 (arguing that "the more lax constitutional treatment given
to the government when it participates in the speech market should not be extended to the government
when it is in fact engaged in market regulation, under the pretext of mere participation"). Chief Justice
Rehnquist's discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctine in Rust is in fact an attempt to reduce
the doctrine to a prohibition of negative subsidies. See Rust v Sullivan. 500 U S. 173. 197 (1991). supra
text accompanying notes 108-1I.
In the vocabulary that I have proposed in this Essay. sse can conceptualize negative subsidies as an
effort to leverage decision rules into conduct rules, and we can conclude that they should therefore be
evaluated according to the standards appropriate to conduct rules. The Court has imposed similar limitations
on a state's ability to leverage market participation into market regulation in the context of the dormant
Commerce Clause. For a review of these cases, see South-Central Timber Des v Wunnickc. 467 U S 82.
94-99 (1984).
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government intervention in public discourse will change the nature of that
discourse. If the state gives prize money to fund a competition for the best
essay on environmental protection rather than on geography, or if it supports
research on the history of America rather than on that of ancient Macedonia,
or if it issues grants to excellent art, or to local art, or to performance art, it
will have had both the purpose and effect of influencing the shape of public
discourse. Such influence is the necessary consequence of abandoning the
standards of content and viewpoint neutrality that we ordinarily impose on
state regulations of public discourse.
We could attempt to circumvent this difficulty by arguing that while some
kinds of distortion of public discourse are inevitable and tolerable, other kinds
are not. Imagine, for example, if Congress were to enact a statute requiring the
NEA to distribute grants only to art supportive of the party in control of
Congress. Our immediate and strong intuition is that such a statute should be
struck down as unconstitutional. Surely this intuition indicates that there are
limits to the kinds of distortion that we would be willing to accept.
The constitutional grounds of this intuition, however, are somewhat
puzzling. The intuition cannot rest merely on the fact that the goal and effect
of the statute is to shape the content of public discourse, because
uncontroversial allocation criteria also have these characteristics. NEA grants
distributed on the basis of artistic excellence have exactly the purpose and
effect of shaping the content of public discourse. Nor can the intuition rest on
the notion that government action seeking to reaffirm the political status quo
is presumptively unconstitutional, for the speech of government officials often
has precisely this purpose, particularly during reelection campaigns.
Perhaps, then, our intuition rests on some ground of difference between
government speech and government grants to private persons. The grounds for
distributing the latter, we might say, must be reasonable, by which we mean
that they must be justifiable by reference to some common value. Grants to
achieve artistic excellence are reasonable because as a culture we share
commitments to the worth of artistic merit. Grants to support research in
history or to support the performance of opera are rational because we
recognize and accept the value of these endeavors.
But what value would underwrite our hypothetical statute? It may advance
the interests of the party in power to receive federally funded artistic support,
but that is not a shared value. We value instead the fairness of the political
process as a whole, which we sharply distinguish from the particular interests
or preferences of specific parties who participate in that process. We may even
go further and observe that awarding grants to art supportive of the political
party in power would impair the fundamental fairness of the political process.
Such grants might be thought analogous to purchasing votes.
These conclusions suggest that our intuition about the unconstitutionality
of the hypothetical statute does not stem from any generic commitment to the
[Vol. 106: 151
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vigor and diversity of public discourse, as in the collectivist theory articulated
in Red Lion, but rather from specific views about the distinct realm of partisan
politics. 18' No doubt this realm embraces far more than simple contretemps
between Republicans and Democrats; its boundaries may even include disputes
that are (so to speak) foregrounded or framed for decision by an electorate or
legislature. 8 2 We would certainly wish to place definite constitutional
limitations on the power of government to dispense subsidies to intervene in
such disputes, and we would probably express those limitations in terms of the
distinction between preferences and values, and in terms of specifically
political norms of fundamental fairness.
We can test this analysis by imagining a congressionally authorized prize
to be awarded annually to the best "patriotic" work of art. Whatever we may
ultimately conclude about the legitimacy of such a prize, it is fair to say that
we would not strongly and immediately intuit that it should be
unconstitutional. A decision rule allocating government subsidies to patriotic
art, even though supportive of the political status quo, is in every material
respect analogous to a decision rule allocating government subsidies to
excellent art. Both artistic excellence and patriotism transcend the specifically
political, because neither can be said to be disputable in a manner framed for
decision; both embody shared values, not preferences; and neither would
violate fundamental norms of political fairness. If the NEA decency clause
were measured by these standards, I suspect that it would easily pass muster.
Decency is not a matter of partisan politics. It is a shared value, not a
preference. And the value of decency is not only consistent with fundamental
norms of political fairness, it is in some respects presupposed by public
discourse itself.
8 3
We can learn from our examination of the hypothetical statute, then, that
there are discrete pockets of constitutional concern that establish limits to the
decision rules that may be used to allocate government subsidies. This is useful
to know, and if we were to engage in a thorough canvass of the subject we
would wish to search out these pockets and identify them. But this insight does
not advance our effort to derive a general standard from the collectivist theory
of Red Lion that will enable us to assess the constitutionality of specific
decision rules.
The most significant and sustained effort to accomplish this task is by
Owen Fiss in his recent book The Irony of Free Speech.'8 Fiss proposes a
181. See SUNSTEIN. supra note 169. at 231-32: Shiffnn. supra note 4. at 612-17. 622-32; Steven
Shiffrin, Government Speech and the Falsification of Consent. 96 HARV L. REV 1745. 1750-51 (1983)
(reviewing YUDOF, supra note 35).
182. For an interesting case study on the proper scope of official lobbying for public referenda. see
Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168 (Or. 1985).
183. For further discussion of the preconditions of public discourse. see POST. supra note 9. at 135-48.
184. OwEN FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
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constitutional standard that would prohibit decision rules allocating government
subsidies "in such a way as to impoverish public debate by systematically
disfavoring views the public needs for self-governance.' ' 5 The question, of
course, is how such unconstitutional decision rules can be identified, and to his
credit, Fiss directly confronts this issue. In doing so, however, he is drawn in
two incompatible directions, so that his analysis ultimately offers a lesson quite
different from that which he intends.
In certain moods Fiss embraces an ideal of government neutrality, which
he strives to realize by proposing criteria for assessing managerial purposes
that are defined in purely procedural terms. 8 6 He argues that the state ought
to fund private speech based on its "relative degree of exclusion....
Arguably, all unorthodox ideas have claim under the First Amendment to
public funding, but perhaps those most unavailable to the public have the
greatest claim."1 87 Fiss also contends that "financial need" ought to be an
additional factor for constitutional consideration.
88
The attraction of these procedural criteria is that they are content neutral.
They depend upon an implicit egalitarian norm that would promote (something
like) equal access for all ideas, and that would thus give extra assistance to
ideas that are excluded because of their obscurity or lack of financial support.
The source of this norm lies within the equal protection jurisprudence of which
Fiss is an acknowledged master.' 9 But that jurisprudence carries within it
certain important assumptions. It presumes, for example, that the norm of
equality is to be applied to units-like individuals or groups-that are finite
in number. It also presumes that there is a metric of equality, whether it be
"educational opportunity" or "dignity," with respect to which each of these
units should be regarded as the equal of every other.
These assumptions, however, are inapplicable in the context of ideas. The
number of potential ideas is infinite, not finite. This implies that a principle
aspiring to provide equal access to all ideas is impossible either to conceive
or to apply. Moreover, there is no common metric-whether it be called
"opportunity for public discussion" or "intrinsic worth"-with respect to which
each of these infinite ideas should be regarded as equal to every other. Many
185. Id. at 42.
186. See id. at 42-43. As Fiss notes:
The ideal of neutrality in the speech context not only requires that the state refrain from
choosing among viewpoints, but also that it not structure public discourse in such a way as to
favor one viewpoint over another. The state must act as a high-minded parliamentiarian, making
certain that all viewpoints are fully and fairly heard.
Fiss, supra note 135, at 2100.
187. FISS, supra note 184, at 44.
188. Id.
189. Fiss refers specifically to this jurisprudence: "Just as some minority groups may be more
disadvantaged than others, some unorthodox ideas may be more hidden from public view than others." Id.
On the general tendency to import Equal Protection norms into First Amendment analysis, see Post, supra
note 6, at 1267-70.
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ideas that are "unavailable" for public consideration are excluded because they
are long dead or decisively repudiated. No one would now take seriously ideas
of human sacrifice, or phlogiston, or the droit du seigneur, and so forth, ad
infinitum. When the government creates decision rules to allocate subsidies for
speech, it need not and should not be under a constitutional obligation to
resuscitate and subsidize each of these ideas merely because they are without
financial support, excluded, or otherwise "unavailable to the public."
Meiklejohn was therefore quite incorrect to claim that there is an "equality
of status in the field of ideas."' 9 There is instead a constitutional equality
of status among persons who propound ideas. 9 ' Because we believe in an
equality of status among speakers, we do not permit the state to regulate public
discourse so as to favor the contributions of some persons more than others,
even if the state believes that the ideas of some are worthier of public attention
or space on the public agenda. 92 But because we do not believe in an
equality of status among ideas, we permit the government to advance and
accentuate discrete and specific ideas when it itself speaks.
93
Fiss is keenly aware of this difficulty, and he is consequently also drawn
to content-based criteria for the constitutional assessment of decision rules for
government subsidies. He believes that the First Amendment should require
government officials affirmatively "to ensure the fullness and richness of
public debate,"' 9 and hence to make decisions "analogous to the judgments
made by the great teachers of the universities of this nation every day of the
week as they structure discussion in their classes."' 95 Fiss fully recognizes
that to fulfill this goal would require "a sense of the public agenda, a grasp of
190. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POuTICAL FREEDOM. TitE COSSTrTIONAL PO %,ERS OF TliE PEOPLE
27 (1948).
191. See Post, supra note 83, at 290-91.
192. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 U S 530 (1980 (invalidating
state prohibition of policy-oriented speech on monthly bills of public utilities). Buckley % Valco. 424 U S
1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept that government may restrct the speech of some clements
of our society in order to enhance the relative value of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment
.... .).
193. This objection would prove fatal even if Fiss's egalitarian criteria were miterpreted to apply only
to the ideas of persons participating within public discourse. Although the potential number of such ideas
may not be infinite, Fiss could not defend this (modified) egalitarian thesis on the ground that a rich and
full public debate requires subsidization of all views articulated within public discour- that happen to be
underfinanced or generally unavailable. It could not plausibly be maintained that public debate sould be
richer if the views of Nazis or Stalinists were subsidized. even if such views vere unorthodox.
marginalized, and not commonly accepted. Surely it would be bizarre to contend that such vievs must be
supported to ensure a better and more informed public dialogue Nor could a modified egalitanan thesis
be defended on the principle that the state ought to treat all persons within public discourse equally, as that
principle would instead require the state to refrain from treating people differently, even if their ideas had
different degrees of acceptance and exposure. The modified egalitarian thesis would therefore have to be
justified by some variant of the notion that the First Amendment requires equality among ideas- But there
is no particular reason to accept this proposed equality, and good reasons to reject it
194. Fiss, supra note 184, at 41.
195. Fiss, supra note 135. at 2101.
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the issues that are now before the public and what might plausibly be brought
before it, and then an appraisal of the state of public discourse."'
9 6
Fiss's proposal to evaluate decision rules for their affirmative contribution
to the fullness and richness of public debate is flatly inconsistent with his
proposal to evaluate decision rules based upon viewpoint neutral criteria, like
those underlying a mechanical egalitarianism. If the agenda of public discourse
were fixed, one might (perhaps) imagine a viewpoint neutral rule mandating
ventilation of all sides of existing issues. But of course the agenda of public
discourse is fiercely contested and controversial. Indeed, "[p]olitical conflict
is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance
on the definition of the issues .... He who determines what politics is about
runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of
conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power."'197 To impose on
government officials a constitutional duty to allocate subsidies based upon their
sense of a proper public agenda is therefore to require them to adopt particular
perspectives within intensely contested controversies.
This is not fatal, however, for we have already seen that decision rules are
often and appropriately viewpoint-based. In fact, a constitutional standard
mandating that decision rules for the allocation of subsidies be evaluated
according to their effect on ensuring the quality of public discourse seems to
me theoretically and constitutionally attractive. The only question that it raises,
and it is not an insignificant question, is how such an affirmative standard
could institutionally be applied by courts. Decisions to disburse subsidies are
always made in the context of scarcity, and they are highly polycentric. g8
Subsidies can be granted according to a virtually infinite set of possible
criteria. Even if a given set of criteria is accepted, there are innumerable
potential grantees and limitless permutations by which funds may be
distributed among any particular set of grantees.
In such circumstances Fiss's proposed standard could not plausibly
function as a set of determinate restrictions on government action; it would
instead have to be conceived as an aspirational goal toward which government
officials should aim. From the perspective of a reviewing court, therefore, the
standard would require judicial evaluation of whether the goal could have been
better achieved through a different set of allocation rules. As this will always
be the case, the adoption of Fiss's proposed standard would lead either to
substantial judicial preemption of, or substantial judicial deference to, decision
rules for allocating subsidies.
196. Id.; see FiSs, supra note 184, at 44-45.
197. E.E. SCHATMSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 68 (Ist ed. 1960). As William H. Riker concisely observes: "Just what is a political issue is itself
a political issue." AGENDA FORMATION 3 (William H. Riker ed., 1993).
198. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 393-405 (1978)
(discussing concept of polycentric tasks and adjudication).
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Given these choices, it is readily predictable that courts will choose the
latter option. They would be right to do so, for judicial preemption of the
allocation criteria for government subsidies would itself operate as a significant
disincentive to government investment in subsidies. Imagine, for example, what
a court would actually do if the NEA budget were slashed to ten million
dollars, and if Congress were to decide that the entire budget ought to be
devoted to opera, or to museum outreach programs, or to innovative ballet
companies, or to some combination of the three. No matter what selection
Congress makes, it will always be possible for a court legitimately to reason
that public discourse could have been made richer by a different choice. If
courts were routinely to take advantage of this fact to alter congressional
funding priorities for the NEA, it is unlikely that Congress would long
continue to support the NEA.
Fiss seems to assume that, contrary to this analysis, he has created a
standard that will operate as a determinate restriction on government decision
rules. He writes that allocation criteria like "family values" would be facially
unconstitutional because of their "pernicious effects on debate by simply
reinforcing orthodoxy."' 99 But Fiss's reasoning in these passages relies on
the mechanical, content-neutral norm of egalitarianism which I have argued
must be abandoned as both theoretically and practically inadequate. Once the
viewpoint discrimination entailed by Fiss's affirmative standard is firmly
assimilated, it is not at all clear how a court could decide that the criterion of
"family values" should be set aside as obviously unconstitutional. If Congress
were to conclude that public debate would be enriched if greater attention were
to be paid to the commonly shared values of the nuclear family-for example.
by funding art on "children of divorce"-a court would have neither more nor
less grounds on which to disagree than if Congress were to decide that the
NEA ought to devote its entire (reduced) budget to opera.
The fact that family values are popular and commonly shared, or, in Fiss's
demeaning term, "orthodox," would not be grounds for abandoning a posture
of judicial deference because, as we have seen, these attributes are precisely
what authenticate the government's support of family values as reasonable and
legitimate. Allocation criteria that are idiosyncratic and without roots in a
common culture would be vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. If a
congressional statute were to mandate that the NEA award grants only to red-
headed artists, a court might well move beyond deference to strike down the
statute as irrational. But the court's ruling would actually depend upon its
perception that the statute could not be justified by reference to shared and
"orthodox" values.
These considerations suggest that even if Fiss's proposed affirmative
standard were accepted-and I think that it should be-courts could not and
199. Fiss, supra note 184, at 37.
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should not use it to set aside decision rules for allocating subsidies except in
extreme and marginal cases. 2° Subsidies that literally overwhelm public
discourse, that seriously rupture foundational notions of a functioning
marketplace of ideas, can and should be set aside. But these will, by definition,
be highly exceptional circumstances. It is in fact most likely that courts will
recognize such exceptional circumstances not by reference to the affirmative
standard of a rich public discourse, but rather by the negative criterion that
Mark Yudof long ago articulated, which identifies the fear that government
decision rules will operate "to falsify consent" by fashioning "a majority will
through uncontrolled indoctrination activities." '' But whichever way the
problem is analyzed-whether from the perspective of a public discourse that
is insufficiently rich or from one that is artificially narrow-the NEA decency
clause does not appear to constitute the kind of rare and exceptional case that
would or should be found unconstitutional.2' z
D. The NEA Controversy Revisited: The Conflict Between Democratic Self-
Governance and Community Self-Definition
It seems, then, that we are faced with the unpalatable choice of either
placing the NEA in a constitutional straitjacket or else liberating it to engage
in a wide range of content-based interventions-interventions that many of us
may find both misguided and offensive. We do not appear to have the option
of picking and choosing, of constitutionally constraining the NEA to decision
rules that we happen to find amenable or of constitutionally empowering the
NEA to promulgate conduct rules that we happen to find wise.
It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect upon why we must choose
between these unattractive options. "The fault," as Shakespeare might have
remarked, "is not in our stars, [b]ut in ourselves. 20 3 It is precisely because
we wish to use the First Amendment to establish a realm of public discourse
in which persons are regarded as autonomous and self-determining that we
impose strict constitutional requirements of neutrality on state regulation of
public discourse. And it is precisely because we wish our government to
exemplify and to advance the particular norms of our community that we relax
these requirements when the state is acting on its own account to support the
nation's arts.
200. Cf YUDOF, supra note 35, at 259 (judicial review of government supported speech appropriate
primarily in "egregious" cases); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
373, 378 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 35).
201. YUDOF, supra note 35, at 15.
202. Fiss does not in fact believe that the decency clause should be set aside as unconstitutional. See
FISS, supra note 184. at 38.
203. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2.
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We face, in other words, a conflict between two constitutional values: that
of democratic self-governance and that of community self-definition. -' It is
the function of constitutional law systematically to describe the internal
architecture of values like these, to embody that architecture in social space,
to articulate its practical ramifications, and, in cases of conflict between values,
to adjudicate their proper boundaries. 20 5 To characterize the decency clause
as a decision rule or as a conduct rule is, in effect, to fix the boundary between
two constitutional values.2°
Where we set that boundary will depend in part upon the manner in which
the decency clause affects the production of art within the public discourse
enveloping the NEA. We would be more likely to classify the clause as a
conduct rule, and hence to subject it to the constraints of a constitutional
regime of democratic self-governance, if we were to regard the clause as
imposing community norms on public discourse. Conversely, we would be
more likely to classify the clause as a decision rule-and hence to be
constitutionally legitimized, if we were to view the clause as merely
encouraging a shared and important community value.
A brief review of the evidence suggests an ambiguous picture. Unlike
section 399 in League of Women Voters, the decency clause does not prohibit
behavior; it merely regulates the availability of subsidies. Although the NEA
is a relatively new organization, some artists may have begun to feel entitled
to its subsidies; but this sense of entitlement does not seem to be shared by the
general public. 2 7 Although the NEA is an important and influential player
in the world of art production, the actual extent of this world's practical
dependence on the NEA is uncertain. 2 s
204. On the fundamental constitutional value of community sclf-dcfitniion. see PoST. supra note 9.
at 1-18, 51-48, 177-96.
205. Ve are, of course, free to alter our constitutional commitments and to pursue different salues.
but, on pain of incoherence, frustration, and hypocrisy. we are not free to ignore the consequence- of the
values we have chosen.
206. On the tension between these two values, vtewed from the perspecti.c of an increasingly
international system of communication, see PRICE. supra note 66. at 233-46
207. For example, one commentator has observed:
The NEA is several years younger than Madonna. Still. early in its brief existence it achiesed
the status of entitlement for those who found themselves for the first time bncliciancs of
federal largess, or, in most of their cases, smallness. The dollar amounts may be minuscule by
comparison with others flung hither and yon by Uncle Sam but the amount of indignation
that can be mustered by those liable to lose these nickels and dimes is truly spectacular Not
merely spectacular, but it has more sniffles and sobs than "-Camille.'"
Jonathan Yardley, NEA Funding: Dollars and Nonsense. WAsii. POST. Jan. 23. 1995. at B2. see also Tim
Miller, An Artist's Declaration of Independence to Congress (July 4. 1990). in CLLTLRE WARS
DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT CONTRovERsIEs IN THE ARm 244. 244-45 (Richard Bolton ed. 1992).
Newt Gingrich, Cutting Cultural Funding: A Reply, TIME. Aug. 21. 1995. at 70; Jeff Jacob). Endowment
of Arrogance, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 9, 1995. at 17A; Jolm Frhnnimaers Final Act. WASh TIMtEs. Feb
24, 1992, at E2 (discussing Frohnmayer's resignation as NEA chairman).
208. In 1995, the NEA's grant-making funds totaled approximately S138 million See National
Endowment for the Arts Office of Policy, Research. and Technology. Table Summarizing NEA Funding
(Nov. 1995) (on file with the Yale Law Journal). In that same year. $265 6 million %~as appropnated
through state art agencies, and an estimated S650 million was allocated by local govermenits See NINA
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To this equivocal evidence must be added one further consideration: The
constitutional consequences of characterizing the decency clause as a conduct
rule are dramatically disabling. Such a characterization would impose on the
NEA crippling requirements of content neutrality, requirements that would
provide strong disincentives for congressional support. Because I set a high
value on encouraging and empowering the government to establish institutions
designed to further norms like artistic excellence, I would myself lean toward
giving ample scope to the value of community self-definition in the context of
NEA subsidies, and I would therefore be quite cautious in characterizing the
decency clause as a conduct rule.
It is not my intention, however, to press these preliminary observations
toward definitive conclusions. My point is instead to stress that a full
understanding of the legal dimensions of the NEA controversy will require a
strong grasp of the importance and implications of the characterization of
government action. Whether courts ultimately come to regard the NEA
decency clause as a conduct rule or as a decision rule, their decision ought to
be informed by a comprehension of the constitutional significance and
consequences of this characterization.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this Essay, I observed that the doctrines of
unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint discrimination are incoherent because
they are excessively abstract and formal, detached from the actual levers of
decision. We can now summarize the jurisprudential causes of this observation.
KRESSNER COBB, PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ARTS & HUMANITIES, LOOKING AHEAD: PRIVATE SECTOR
GIVING TO THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES 5 (1995). Furthermore, foundation funding for the arts in 1992,
the most recent year for which complete data are available, totaled approximately $1.36 billion. See id.
Finally, according to one survey, corporate funding for the arts in 1994 totaled $875 million. See id. Figures
for individual giving to the arts are not readily available, but simply extrapolating from these estimates of
government, foundation and corporate donations, it is likely that NEA support for the arts is about 5% of
total donations.
This estimate may understate the extent of NEA influence, because the NEA is the single largest
donor to the arts and because NEA grants are often highly leveraged through requirements for matching
funds. See id. at 18-20. The NEA's national prestige also creates independent leverage, so that, as the
President's Committee on the Arts and Humanities stated: "The funding patterns demonstrate a complex
national cultural structure in which private and public donor sectors reinforce each other, funding different
pieces and parts, exercising different priorities within the whole.... [Tihe public and private sectors
,operate in synergistic combination."' Id. at 4.
It is also the case, however, that the estimate of 5% may strikingly overstate the extent of NEA
influence because it does not account for income earned by artists and arts organizations directly through
ticket sales, art purchases, and the like. We know, for example, that in disciplines like music, dance, and
theater earned income can account for between 50% and 60% of total revenues. See President's Committee
on the Arts and Humanities, Chart Displaying Sources of Operating Income for Various Disciplines (1994)
(on file with the Yale Law Journal). For an argument that "the pervasive role the NEA plays in the art
world and the funding mechanisms on which artists and museums depend" gives to it "the ability to
effectively silence artists who express disfavored views," see Hawthorne, supra note 174, at 438. For a
contrary view, see ALICE GOLDFARB MARQUIS, ART LESSONS: LEARNING FROM THE RISE AND FALL OF
PUBLIC ARTS FUNDING 246-53 (1995).
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First Amendment rights of freedom of expression are methods of
structuring legal interventions that define and enforce the consequences of
constitutional values. Because these values are particular to specific social
domains, so are First Amendment rights .2 ' The doctrines of unconstitutional
conditions and viewpoint discrimination, however, purport to apply universally,
to control all aspects of social space. When courts are asked to employ the
doctrines in situations where the doctrines do not correspond to relevant
constitutional values, courts must deform and evade the doctrines, twisting
them into ever more confused, arbitrary, and irrelevant shapes.
To rehabilitate First Amendment doctrine means to fashion it to address
the actual values that move our constitutional decisionmaking. Even then
doctrine may not compel specific outcomes in particular cases. What we have
a right to expect from doctrine is that it force us to confront and to clarify the
constitutional values that matter to us. My ambition in this Essay is to have
articulated in cases of subsidized speech two doctrinal inquiries that seem to
me useful in this way. The first involves the characterization of speech, and
it requires us to determine the domain to which the subsidized speech at issue
in a particular case should be assigned. We must decide whether to classify
subsidized speech as within public discourse or as within some other domain
like that of management or professional speech. As we locate subsidized
speech in social space, so we identify the constitutional value that we attach
to the speech and the concomitant set of constitutional constraints that we will
apply to its regulation.
The second inquiry involves the characterization of government action, and
it requires us to determine whether the standards allocating government
subsidies should be understood as regulations of subsidized speech or instead
as internal directives to state officials dispensing subsidies. If we classify the
standards as regulations, we shall subject them to the full array of
constitutional constraints required by the domain in which the subsidized
speech is located. But if we instead regard the standards as internal directives,
we shall cede to the government a far freer hand in exemplifying and
advancing national values.
209. See Post, supra note 6.
1996]

